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Setting up reliable communications after a disaster is an extremely difficult yet crucial 
requirement for coordinating relief efforts. Lessons learned from recent humanitarian 
disasters point to major difficulties in establishing communications to quickly and 
accurately assess responder needs in the affected area and communicating this 
information to first responders from government relief agencies, Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and the military.   
The military’s growing role in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) 
missions makes it imperative that military first responders coordinate with partner relief 
groups to improve the current assessment and relief processes. The current assessment 
and relief processes are generally ineffective due to inherent mistrust between responding 
organizations and lack of experience working together in a chaotic and time-pressed 
environment. 
This research analyzes issues with the current processes utilized by responders in 
HA/DR missions and researches if “Netted Humanitarian” responders trained in the set 
up/operation of Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) equipment can improve the process of 
assessing the ICT situation on the ground following a disaster. It further delves into the 
possibility that these highly trained individuals will expedite overcoming the 
communications vacuum that immediately follows a natural disaster, and will be 
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Establishing access to reliable communications after a natural disaster or human 
catastrophe is extremely difficult to achieve, yet it is a crucial requirement in order to 
coordinate relief efforts. However, lessons learned from recent humanitarian disasters 
have pointed to major difficulties in establishing portable communication systems in 
order to quickly and accurately assess the needs in the affected area and communicate 
this information to first responders from the United States and foreign militaries, 
government relief agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Without 
effective communications and readily accessible information systems, the entire relief 
effort becomes even more problematic for first responders. 
The quality and timeliness of information shapes the effectiveness of emergency 
response efforts (Horan & Schooley, 2007). Unfortunately, the recurring theme in post-
crisis emergency response evaluations of first responders suggest that many disaster 
management systems often fall short of the capability to deal with the complex and 
uncertain environment typically encountered. Individual organizations have designed 
assessment processes and information systems that are focused on intra-organizational 
information flow. Therefore, these systems are not capable of adapting to the rapidly 
evolving and fluid environment of disaster scenarios. Improving the initial assessment 
process also entails improving the manner in which first responder organizations 
collaborate and coordinate efforts during the relief mission. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The United States military has placed an increasing emphasis on publicizing the 
importance it is placing on participation in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
(HA/DR) missions. Therefore, it is imperative that military first responders work with 
partner relief groups to improve the current assessment and relief processes. The problem 
is that the current assessment and disaster relief  response processes are generally 
ineffective due to the inherent mistrust between responding organizations and the lack of 
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experience those organizations have in working with each other in a chaotic and time-
pressed environment. One of the areas where this ineffectiveness is highlighted is in 
conducting initial assessments of the impact that natural disaster have on the Information 
and Communications Technology (ICT) infrastructure. ICT is an area that directly 
impacts every other portion of overall relief efforts, yet up to this point no inter-
organizational or international entity exists to conduct this crucial assessment post-
disaster and share this critical component of information with other first responders in the 
International Humanitarian Community (IHC). 
C. PURPOSE STATEMENT 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the current assessment processes utilized 
by responders in HA/DR missions and investigate if Netted Humanitarian responders that 
receive specialized training in the operation and employment of Hastily Formed 
Networks (HFN) communication equipment can improve the process of assessing the 
ICT situation immediately following a natural disaster or human catastrophe. 
Additionally, this research explores the possibility of employing Netted Humanitarians in 
the construct of multi-organizational and multi-national Rapid Technology Assessment 
Teams (RTAT). This research delves into the possibility that these highly trained teams 
of Netted Humanitarians will expedite overcoming the communications vacuum that 
immediately follows a natural disaster, and will be beneficial in coordinating the 
combined recovery efforts of the host nation, NGOs, International Governmental 
Organizations (IGOs) and other United States government (USG) agencies. 
D. OBJECTIVES 
The process improvement advocated by this thesis deals primarily with improving 
the ICT assessment process for responding to disasters. A primary assumption is that the 
current emergency response infrastructure is already well established and effective in 
dealing with routine emergencies. Thus, this thesis focuses primarily on improving  
the ICT assessment capabilities of first responders when faced with a crisis emergency  
of such a magnitude that the existing capabilities and resources are ineffective for 
beginning the relief process. The author looked specifically at establishing a rapidly 
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deployable communications infrastructure in the immediate aftermath of a disaster 
(within 12–24 hours) that will be comprised of first responders with technical and 
operational background in establishing the beginning stages of a Hastily Formed Network 
(HFN). 
This thesis not only proposes a solution for improving the effectiveness of the 
current ICT assessment process, but to also improve the efficiency of the assessment 
process. With the uncertainty of the current financial situation in the United States and 
other nations around the globe, resources in HA/DR missions are limited and cannot 
afford to be wasted due to duplication of effort as a result of failing to integrate the 
recovery efforts of the IHC. As a result of the limited availability of resources, it is 
important that human and financial assets are utilized in a sustainable manner that still 
accomplishes the mission of bringing relief to the affected population. Collaboration, 
integration and deeper cooperation between responding agencies is essential to making 
this goal a reality. The concepts of RTAT and the Netted Humanitarian were designed 
with this reality in mind.  
E. BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
The primary potential benefit from this research is the proposed inclusion of the 
robust communication capabilities of Netted Humanitarians within the construct of the 
RTAT program. The RTAT program was initially an Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD) funded program from 2010 to 2012. The primary purpose for establishing RTAT 
was to create a much needed mechanism for conducting a rapid assessment of the ICT 
status that would enable the host nation and the IHC to provide a targeted allocation of 
resources that would result in a reduction of gaps and duplication of effort (Steckler, 
2012). Additionally, conduct of this assessment would positively affect other facets of the 
disaster response effort by providing a current and constantly updated Common 
Operating Picture (COP), resulting in greater efficiency and effectiveness of relief efforts. 
The COP would in turn allow for better cooperation and collaboration between 
responding agencies, which would result in additional costs savings. The RTAT program 
also seeks to provide a pool of multi-disciplinary experts who are capable of rapidly 
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deploying to a disaster zone (Steckler, 2012). Given the multi-organizational and multi-
national make-up of the Netted Humanitarians that would comprise RTAT, another 
potential benefit of this study is the quicker establishment of trust between responding 
agencies, which will lead to a greater willingness to share information. Additionally, the 
inclusion of data fusion software promises to more easily allow decision makers to ask 
the questions they need answered vice having to filter through mountains of data from 
multiple disparate sources. 
F. DEFINITIONS 
 
Bandwidth   The transmission range of an electronic communications  
    device or system; the speed of data transfer. 
 
BGAN    Broadband Global Area Network terminal, which is a  
    satellite earth terminal owned and operated by the   
    company InMarsat. 
 
Command and Control The means by which a commander recognizes what needs  
     to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. 
 
Communication  This is the act or process of communicating by any means 
    of communication. 
 
COP    A Common Operating Picture is a single identical display  
    of relevant information shared by more than one command. 
    A COP facilitates collaborative planning and assists all  
    echelons to achieve situational awareness. 
 
Data Fusion   Data fusion is the process of integrating multiple data  
    and knowledge sources representing the same real-world  
    object into a single consistent, accurate, and useful   
    representation. 
 
Data Transfer   Copying or moving data from one place to another,   
    typically via some form of network. 
 
First Responder  A certified, often volunteer, emergency, medical, law 
     enforcement officer or military member who is first to 
    arrive at an accident or disaster scene. 
 
Form Factor   The physical size and shape of a device. 
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HA/DR   Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief is a mission that is 
    deployed to a disaster zone. 
 
Hotspot   A hotspot is a site that offers Internet access over a  
wireless local area network using a router connected  
to a link to an Internet service provider. Hotspots  
typically use Wi-Fi technology. 
 
ICT    Information and Communication Technology. Refers to  
    technologies that provide access to information through  
    telecommunications. It is similar to Information   
    Technology (IT), but focuses primarily on communication  
    technologies. This includes the Internet, wireless networks,  
    cell phones, and other communication mediums. 
 
Infrastructure   Encompasses the basic and underlying framework of 
    features of a system or organization. 
 
Netted Humanitarian  An individual member of a Rapid Technology Assessment  
    Team who is a subject matter  expert in the operation of  
    various types of portable communications equipment and  
    disaster relief. They are designed to rapidly deploy to a  
    disaster zone with only the portable communications  
    equipment they are able to carry on themselves to conduct  
    ICT assessments.    
 
RTAT    Rapid Technology Assessment Team is an assessment team 
    comprised of Netted Humanitarians that is deployable  
    within 12–24 hours of a disaster taking place. The mission  
    of RTAT is to conduct an early assessment of the impact  
    the disaster had on the ICT infrastructure of the affected  
    area. 
 
Software   The programs used to direct he operation of a computer, 
    As well as documentation giving instructions on how to 
    Use them. 
 
VSAT    Very Small Aperture Satellite Terminal. Comprising 
    many different earth terminals that vary in size, power 
    and overall capabilities. 
 
Wi-Fi    A local area network that uses high frequency radio 
    signals to transmit and receive data over distances of a  
    few hundred feet; utilizes Ethernet protocol. 
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G. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is organized in the following fashion: 
Chapter I provides for the introduction and overview of this thesis. 
Chapter II discusses what a Hastily Formed Network is and some of the 
challenges faced by participants in this type of network. 
Chapter III describes the current disaster response process and discusses how the 
concept of the Netted Humanitarian could improve the process. 
Chapter IV discusses implementation of Netted Humanitarians with Rapid 
Technology Assessment Teams and provides examples of how they could improve the 
current disaster response process.   
Chapter V summarizes the recommendations of this thesis and provides 
recommendations for future research. 
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II. HASTILY FORMED NETWORKS 
In general terms, a Hastily Formed Network is a portable and rapidly deployable 
communications system that allows first responders to communicate, share information, 
coordinate relief efforts and attain situational awareness after a natural disaster occurs. 
They are composed of individuals from a broad variety of organizations and geographic 
locations that have come together in order to bring relief to a disaster-stricken area. The 
HFN becomes the medium, or “conversation space” through which first responders pool 
their knowledge and interpretations of the situation, understand what resources are 
available to them, assess options, plan responses, decide, commit, act, and coordinate 
(Denning, 2006). Lessons learned from recent disasters repeatedly show that the 
effectiveness of the response was due in large part to the quality of the network that was 
able to come together to respond to the crisis. Specifically, how well were the various 
responding organizations able to collaborate to restore voice and data communications in 
order to effectively and efficiently provide assistance to victims of the disaster? 
All HFNs share five essential elements. It is a (1) “a network of people 
established rapidly (2) from different communities, (3) working together 
in a shared conversation space (4) in which they plan, commit to, and 
execute actions, to (5) fulfill a large, urgent mission.” It is important to 
note that while the networking technology is vital to reestablishing 
communications and ultimately the success of relief efforts, the overall 
success of a Hastily Formed Network depends as much if not more on the 
people that are a part of the network as the communications hardware 
itself. (Denning, 2006) 
A. RELEVANCY TO MILITARY PROFESSIONALS 
This topic is especially relevant in today’s military environment when one 
considers the military’s growing role in HA/DR missions. The South East Asia tsunami, 
Hurricane Katrina, the Haiti earthquake, the earthquake in Japan, and Hurricane Sandy 
are all examples of recent global disasters in which the United States military played a 
large role in providing humanitarian aid and relief. This is likely to be an area of focus for 
the U.S. Armed Forces for the foreseeable future. The U.S. Navy’s latest television ads, 
proclaiming it “A Global Force for Good,” are an example of this trend.   Part of the 
 8
Navy’s recruiting campaign explicitly details how the Navy stands ready to answer the 
need for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief anywhere and anytime. With such an 
emphasis on making this an important mission area for our military, it is critical for 
military professionals, and especially future leaders, to understand the role their service, 
unit, or they themselves might play in HA/DR missions. To illustrate this point, when 
Hurricane Irene threatened the entire East Coast of the United States in August 2011, 
27 naval warships were ordered to get underway from Norfolk Naval Station in an effort 
to avoid the oncoming storm, including the USS Wasp (LHD-1). However, in addition to 
avoiding Hurricane Irene, the Wasp was prepared to carry out a much different mission. 
If called upon, Wasp was prepared to provide state and civilian authorities humanitarian 
assistance through a variety of services to deal with the aftermath of the storm. In 
addition to providing medical facilities and utilizing its helicopters for delivering aid and 
search and rescue missions, the Wasp could also have used its communications suite to 
act as a communications link to the world outside the affected area.   
In response to the havoc that Hurricane Sandy  caused in the northeastern United 
States in October 2012, the Navy sent three large deck amphibious ships off the waters of 
New York and New Jersey to prepare to provide assistance if called upon to do so. 
Additionally, the Pentagon mobilized over 10,000 Army and Air Force National Guard 
personnel to provide support to the 13 states most heavily impacted by Hurricane Sandy. 
The aforementioned examples are just some of the reasons that make training 
specialized military personnel with the skill set required to set up Hastily Formed 
Networks a critical requirement. This training should not focus solely on learning the 
technical aspects involved with understanding how to set up, operate and maintain the 
gear, but also must include lessons learned and best practices for coordinating with other 
relief organizations. 
Hastily Formed Networks provide a much needed service to the region affected 
by a natural disaster. Without emergency communications, coordinating with other first 
responders becomes nearly impossible. This presents a great challenge to successfully 
providing aid where it is most needed and in minimizing duplicity of effort. A key 
characteristic of HFNs is their ability to utilize Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
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wireless equipment, such as satellite communication, Wi-Fi and Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), in order to provide communication for 
regions affected by natural or man-made disasters. Additionally, and probably most 
importantly, the equipment is designed to be relatively simple to operate and portable 
(Lim & Ng, 2007). 
Another key attribute of a successful HFN is its level of self-sufficiency. The 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Hastily Formed Networks Research Group is a model for 
self-sufficiency. The school’s HFN team is structured in a specific manner for deploying 
to regions affected by natural disasters of a large magnitude. The team deployed to Haiti 
in response to the powerful earthquake that left much of the country in ruins, bringing 
with it hard-cased “fly away kits” with the group’s communications equipment. Also 
included in the kits was critical material that allowed the team to be self-contained. 
According to the Director of NPS’s HFN group, the team brings with it “everything we’d 
need if deployed on the ground – portable light-weight tents, sleeping bags, meals ready 
to eat, water purification and filtration equipment, alternate power, cooking equipment, 
various communications devices, you name it” (Honegger, 2010).  
Specialized communications gear can be used by an HFN team to set up Internet 
access capabilities, which in turn enables voice/chat (Skype), video, email and data 
communications via satellite. Broadband Global Area Network satellite units (BGANs) 
allow HFN responders to connect to the Internet via the International Maritime Satellite 
Network within five minutes. BGANs are also capable of generating 100‐meter wireless 
“clouds.”  These clouds can then be connected to one another using WiMAX terrestrial 
long- haul wireless point‐to‐point networks that can extend up to 30 miles, bringing links 
from one site to another in point‐to‐point mode or with multiple hops. Wi-Fi clouds can 
create temporary Internet “cafes” in hospitals or field clinics, boat or helicopter landing 
zones, and key relief sites. Additionally, GPS devices and visualization systems are 
utilized to provide command and control situational awareness. Using tools such as 
Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) to develop, share and edit a COP is 
mission critical when dealing with a humanitarian disaster. In an HA/DR mission, first 
responders are often spread out over a wide area and the ability to communicate with one 
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another is often challenging. Even something as simple as a satellite phone can provide 
critical information sharing capabilities (Honegger, 2010).  
An HFN is much more than just the communications system itself. If the people 
that form the backbone of the network are unwilling or unable to trust each other, the 
relief efforts will become much more difficult. When multiple organizations respond to a 
crisis or disaster, they bring with them their own way of conducting business as well as 
their own cultural, organizational, and legal norms. Unlike organizations dealing with 
each other in a civil and stable environment, these organizations are attempting to 
coordinate in an uncertain and chaotic environment, which only adds to the level of 
mistrust (Janssen, 2010). Furthermore, each organization brings with it organizational 
biases and social habits. In particular, organizational social identity bias can be a major 
impediment to collaboration. Organization social identity creates an environment where 
information is shared within the organization but not outside the group. Studies have 
shown that when group members are under stress, they do not think to collaborate or 
share information with those outside the boundaries of their organization, and have no 
incentive to worry about the welfare of other groups (Denning, 2006). 
B. LACK OF TRUST 
Adding to this problem is the inherent lack of trust between specific 
organizations. Traditionally, the military and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
have experienced a lack of understanding and appreciation for the roles of the other in an 
HA/DR mission. Differences in culture and command structure inevitably lead to 
mistrust. NGOs tend to see the military’s organizational structure as too rigid and 
inflexible and overly authoritative in nature. In contrast, NGOs tend to be much less 
structured, relying to a greater extent on establishing inter-personal relationships to 
accomplish their goals. Furthermore, a general lack of experience working together in 
coordinated disaster exercises or real-world disaster relief tends to create an even larger 
barrier to building trust and establishing an effective HFN (Wentz, 2006). 
Trust can be defined as the point when the one party has a fundamental belief that 
the other can be relied upon to fulfill their obligations with integrity, and will act in the 
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best interests of the other (Tatham & Kovacs, 2010). It is important to note that this 
definition of trust focuses on inter-personal, rather than intra- or inter-organizational 
relationships. It is argued that decisions within organizations are made by individuals 
and, therefore, the level of intra/inter-organizational trust can be seen as a reflection of 
those individual relationships—although it is recognized that, in reality, the spectrum of 
possible and actual relationships is significantly more complex. Of high importance to 
building stronger working relationships in an HA/DR environment is developing what 
Peter Tatham coins in his article Developing and Maintaining Trust in Post-disaster 
Hastily Formed Networks, as “Swift Trust.”  Swift trust is the preferred route to 
developing trust in an HA/DR mission, due to the need to quickly establish trusting inter-
personal relationships in a very short period of time (Tatham & Kovacs, 2010). The five 
antecedent conditions to developing swift trust are: 
 Role—trust is assumed based on the role a person holds in an 
organization. For example, logisticians in an HA/DR are trusted to be 
experts in logistics. 
 Third party information—trust is developed based on third parties 
opinions based on reputation and prior experience working with that 
particular individual. 
 Category—trust is dependent on membership of individuals in social 
groups or categories. Difficulties between NGOs and the military often 
correspond to perceived differences in goals and organizational 
stereotypes. 
 Rule—trust is based on following the rules of an organization, therefore, 
an individual is deemed trustworthy if they follow the rules. 
 Disposition—trust is dependent on the general disposition of an individual 
to trust other people. Some people are just inherently more trusting of 
others. 
C. INFORMATION SHARING 
When trust between responding organizations is not present, the sharing of vital 
information also becomes a scarce commodity. As a result, relief efforts are often 
duplicated by the various organizations as there is little to no communication flow 
between the responders. This lack of coordination creates a waste of effort, wasted 
manpower, and handicaps relief efforts by not maximizing available resources. Since 
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large incidents involve a large number of agencies, command structures that are unclear, 
often conflicting, uncooperative, and isolated, tend to exacerbate the problem of sharing 
information (Donahue & Tuohy, 2006).    
Although the vast majority of relief organizations agree that information sharing 
is critical to the success of their particular organization and the entire effort as a whole, 
the problem persists. When dealing with information within and outside distinct 
organizations, information is considered an important asset that must be produced, 
retrieved, processed, validated and distributed between organizations (Bharosa, Lee, & 
Janssen, 2010). Yet again, despite the obvious benefits of sharing information between 
first responders, and despite having the conversation space in the form of the Hastily 
Formed Network available, organizations still do a woeful job of sharing invaluable and 
possibly life-saving information. Organizations become focused on sharing information 
within their organizational boundaries while ignoring or being unaware of other 
responding groups and collaborating toward common goals. This tendency creates 
organizational information silos that provide little incentive to move toward a model that 
values horizontal information sharing. 
With regard to the information flow among first responders, timing is everything. 
If information is received too late, it may fail to prevent damages or losses, while if it is 
too early, it may be neglected. Additionally, too much information, known as information 
glut, can overload responders’ ability to process and utilize the information in a timely 
manner. 
D. INTEROPERABILITY 
Even when organizations have developed the level of trust required to share 
information freely during an HA/DR mission, problems with interoperability often derail 
effective information flow. Much of this lack of interoperability can be attributed to the 
use of a wide variety of communications systems hardware and software. Each 
responding organization brings with it its specific capabilities and communications 
equipment, which works wonderfully within the spectrum of the organization’s network, 
but fails to be interoperable when coordinating with other organizations that also 
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constitute the HFN. An example of this would be a certain organization using a Windows 
based system, while another might use a Linux based system. The existence of isolated, 
highly fragmented and unrelated computer applications within individual organizations 
has resulted in major interoperability issues and has led to the creation of “isolated 
islands of technology” in information systems (Janssen, 2010).   
However, problems with interoperability are not solely a result of incompatible 
communications equipment. Often the greater problem evolves from the unique policies 
and procedures of individual organizations which make the process of collaborating with 
other organizations exceedingly difficult. Even a capability as seemingly routine as 
accessing web-based email accounts can create numerous difficulties when doing so 
using another entity’s network, especially in the time pressed world of HA/DR. A 
Department of Defense (DoD) report by the department’s Chief Information Officer 
claimed that policies and procedures in place frustrated efforts to share information 
across the civil-military boundary during the military’s response to the devastating 
December 2004 South East Asia Tsunami (Brewin, 2005). Security policies in place 
prevented employees from the United Nations, other NGOs, and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID), from being able to communicate using the USS 
Abraham Lincoln’s network. Despite having a robust communications suite that included 
wideband satellite links, the civilians embarked onboard the Abraham Lincoln were 
prevented from accessing simple web based email services (Brewin, 2005). These same 
civilian employees were also prevented from attending the ship’s daily unclassified 
briefings regarding the relief efforts, again preventing them from being able to more 
easily coordinate and share information to better assist the relief efforts. 
During the combined response to Hurricane Katrina, despite the fact that Federal, 
State, and local agencies had communications plans and assets in place, the plans and the 
assets involved were inadequate and not effectively integrated to respond to the disaster 
(DHS, 2006).   Moreover, many of the assets available were not properly utilized in the 
effort because no national, state, or regional communications plan was in place to 
incorporate them. Without a doubt, the inability to connect the various communications 
plans and architectures greatly impeded coordination and communication at the Federal, 
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State, and local level (DHS, 2006). Open architecture and flexibility are key components 
to future communications technology in HA/DR environments (Boland, 2006). 
All these examples of past failures and shortcomings regarding interoperability 
point to a real issue by responding agencies in formulating a cohesive Enterprise 
Architecture (EA). The EA defines and inter-relates data, hardware, software, and 
communications resources, as well as the supporting organization required to maintain 
the overall physical structure required by the architecture (Janssen, 2010).   EA can be 
utilized as a tool for effective decision making and the development of a more 
interoperable information system. Granted, EAs in disaster response are by necessity 
general and basic in nature. This allows them to be more easily adapted by a wider range 
of responding organizations. While a necessary trait, this makes the EA more rigid and 
less adaptable to the unique characteristics involved with crisis management. 
Stakeholders need to collaborate and strive for an EA that is more adaptable to quickly 
developing situations and is easily understood by participants. This necessitates the 
creation of a shared vision, improved communication among stakeholders and critical 
evaluation of the impact the shared EA will have on the HFN and its response processes. 
E. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Dr. Peter J. Denning, Director of the Cebrowski Institute for Innovation and 
Information Superiority at the Naval Postgraduate School further defines Hastily Formed 
Networks as “an organizational structure that is (a) put together quickly in response to an 
emergency, crisis, or urgent situation, (b) for a collection of entities who have expertise 
or local responsibility to help but have not worked together before, (c) and who accept no 
higher decision-making authority” (Denning & Hayes-Roth, 2006). The last portion of 
the definition is likely to be particularly troubling to most military organizations, as it 
goes against the military ethos and is contrary to the traditional military hierarchical 
command and control structure.  
While the hierarchical command structure certainly has its place in organizations 
such as the military, Dr. Denning argues that they are not effective in what he coins 
“hyper-networks.” Denning defined a hyper-network as “federated activities toward 
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common goals among multiple organizations that retain their separate identities and have 
no common hierarchy” (Denning & Hayes-Roth, 2006). This is an extremely accurate 
description of what transpires in an HA/DR. To further complicate efforts, the HFN does 
not have the benefit of having much time to adapt and learn before it is expected to 
produce results. For these reasons, Dr. Denning determined that a decentralized decision 
making structure is the most effective in creating a successful HFN. 
F. LACK OF KNOWLEDGE BY RESPONDERS 
Another persistent problem that continues to be identified in “hot washes,” After 
Action Reports, and Lessons Learned documents is the relative lack of knowledge most 
responders have in understanding basic systems for disaster response. With regard to 
disasters in the United States, in addition to the National Response Plan (NRP) and the 
National Response Framework (NRF) that replaced it after Hurricane Katrina, the two 
primary systems involved are Incident Command System (ICS) and the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS).  
Many difficult lessons were learned during the often criticized federal response to 
the disaster wrought by Hurricane Katrina to the Gulf Coast region of the United States. 
Among them was the fact that key decision-makers at all levels simply were not familiar 
with the plans. When Hurricane Katrina struck, the NRP was not well understood by 
most officials involved in the response, and thus this lack of knowledge resulted in 
ineffective coordination of the Federal, State, and local response (DHS, 2006). 
Furthermore, the NRP itself was only intended to be a base plan that outlined the overall 
elements of a response.   Federal departments and agencies were supposed to create their 
own individual operational plans and standard operating procedures (SOPs) in order to 
integrate their response plans into the national response plan. It later came to light that 
this had not taken place at all or was still in progress at most of the federal departments 
and agencies involved. Furthermore, the majority of deployed Federal personnel lacked a 
working knowledge of NIMS or even a basic understanding of ICS principles. This  
resulted in valuable time and resources being devoted to provide on the-job ICS training 
to Federal personnel, rather than dedicating those resources to relief efforts (DHS, 2006).  
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G. APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED 
Compiling a list of lessons learned after an evolution, exercise, or large-scale 
event is commonplace in the military realm. Military organizations go to great lengths to 
annotate, publish and distribute this information to their forces. Similar requirements for 
compiling lessons learned exist in the vast majority of civilian organizations. Despite this 
fact, applying those lessons learned in HA/DR seems to continue to evade first 
responders. Hastily Formed Networks are no exception to this trend. Lessons Learned 
from previous HA/DR missions should be used to drive new and improved policy, the 
generation of HFN and HA/DR concepts of operation, and perhaps most importantly 
solve the non-technical, social and civil-military issues that are all too common in recent 
large-scale disasters (Steckler, Bradford, & Urrea, 2005). Applying these lessons will go 
a long way toward changing perceptions and supporting DoD policy that acknowledges 
that military-civilian teams are a critical U.S. government stability operations tool (DoD, 
2009). 
H. LACK OF COORDINATED EXERCISES 
Lessons learned from recent disasters have documented that a lack of coordinated 
multi-organizational exercises detracts from the effectiveness of response efforts. 
Furthermore, interagency training and rehearsal is absolutely fundamental to real disaster 
preparedness (DHS, 2006). The leadership of organizations that respond to HA/DR 
missions must better understand the urgent need to conduct exercises in order to train 
their responders to deal with the inherent difficult involved in HA/DR, in order to get on 
with the goal of saving lives. 
However, just conducting exercises is not enough to prepare responders to operate 
in an HA/DR environment. The right balance between the known and unknown must be 
struck in order to prepare for events that are likely to happen as well as those that are 
unforeseen. Furthermore, those that develop these exercises should be free to be 
imaginative in designing scenarios that will test the responders, without being so far-
fetched that they are a waste of time. Exercises must be realistic and not overly simplistic 
(Donahue & Tuohy, 2006). Finally, these exercises should be designed to be difficult, 
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and if the right steps are not taken by responders, then failure of the exercise is a possible 
outcome. However, the participants should not be afraid to fail, as long as they are 
learning from their mistakes. There should be no punitive action other than conducting 
more training in order to pass the exercise scenario. This will further prepare exercise 
participants to deal with the inevitable setbacks that are bound to occur in a real-world 
HA/DR mission.  
I. PROPOSAL FOR THE WAY AHEAD 
One can clearly deduce from the previous sections that attaining effective 
collaboration between first responders in a HFN is exceptionally difficult. Despite having 
the same goals and desires to help the people affected by a disaster, often times first 
responders find themselves increasingly frustrated by efforts to coordinate with one 
another and conduct an effective and efficient multi-agency disaster response.   
The general consensus in the crisis response community is that enabling shared 
access to information among autonomous relief agencies is the main bottleneck when it 
comes to effective inter-agency crisis response. Improvements in the area of information 
sharing, coordination and collaboration are crucial due to the fact that access to core 
information by first responders inevitably leads to improved effectiveness and 
efficiencies throughout the network. An inordinately large number of failures and 
difficulties encountered in the disaster relief missions are directly attributable to poor 
coordination in the first responder community. This results in issues such as poor 
allocation of first responder resources, counter-productive ordering of sequential relief 
processes, and delayed evacuations, all of which serve to exacerbate the crisis and could 
result in higher casualties (Bharosa et al., 2010). 
Multi-agency coordination runs counter to the normal independent operating 
mode of the individual organizations in non-disaster related situations. However, when 
disaster strikes and coordination between agencies becomes paramount, complexity often 
arises from the difficulty in effectively synchronizing a relief effort with the various 
elements, systems, processes and actors involved. This makes obtaining a clear and 
reliable picture of the disaster situation exceptionally challenging.  
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If a successful response to a crisis situation is absolutely dependent on 
information flowing in a coordinated fashion among multi-agency responders, does it not 
make sense to implement integrated teams composed of responders from across the 
disaster relief community?  These teams would train together, work under the same 
standardized response framework, and would already be accustomed to working together 
in a tightly organized fashion prior to the disaster. We know that coordination and 
sharing of information revolves around the varying organizational operational structures. 
Some organizations, like the military, are hierarchical in structure and tend to be more 
authoritative when making decisions. Others are much more informal and horizontally 
structured, which leads to a more democratic approach to decision making. The internal 
cultures and mode of operation of the individual organizations lead to distinct and 
tailored roles, procedures and capabilities designed to deal with a crisis situation. This 
becomes a challenge when organizations are expected to coordinate, collaborate, and 
become interoperable with one another. Formulating teams of experts from across the 
disaster relief community could help alleviate many of these concerns. 
This thesis researches the possibility of creating multi-organizational Netted 
Humanitarians that would operate within the framework of a Rapid Technology 
Assessment Team (RTAT). Netted Humanitarians, as part of an RTAT, would serve a 
crucial purpose by improving coordination and cooperation in the early stages of a 
disaster relief mission. Cooperation between responding agencies falls into three 
categories: 
 Coordination of services, essentially who will be where doing what 
 Distribution of resources, in other words ensuring that the required  
medicine, supplies and equipment reach those who need it, when they 
need it 
 Orchestration of controls, to include quarantines, evacuations, or 
movement of population subgroups. 
All of these areas are dependent on timely, accurate information. Transfer of 
information between people that lack day-to-day partnerships become particularly 
important when large numbers of volunteers or donations are involved. To make this 
happen requires effective collaboration, good organization, clear leadership, and sensible 
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preparation (Gibbons, 2007). This is where the concepts of the Netted Humanitarian and 
RTAT could play a key and pivotal role. Through rapid deployment in the first 12 to 
24hours, the Netted Humanitarians of the RTAT would be able to set up rapid portable 
communications and begin the critical initial Information Technology (IT) assessment of 
the disaster. One way to think of RTAT is as the advanced survey team prior to the 
arrival of first responders. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and power 
sectors are critical to the response after major disasters. A rapid assessment of the ICT 
status will enable the host nation and the IHC to provide a targeted allocation of 
resources and will result in a reduction of gaps and duplication of effort. The vision for 
RTAT is to pave the way through a rapid yet structured initial assessment process, with 
the primary goal of assessing ICT needs and establishing the magnitude of the disaster in 
order for follow-on responding agencies to orchestrate relief efforts more effectively and 
efficiently. This would be conducted through the use of highly portable communications 
equipment in fly-away kits capable of being carried by highly mobile Netted 
Humanitarians. The following chapter provides greater detail into the concepts of the 
Netted Humanitarian and RTAT. 
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III. DISASTER RESPONSE PROCESS AND THE NETTED 
HUMANITARIAN 
A. ROUTINE VS. CRISIS EMERGENCIES 
There is an important distinction routine and crisis emergencies. When a 
particular type of emergency happens between sufficiently frequently in an area where 
people have (or should have) resources to organize and prepare, it becomes a routine 
event. Examples of a routine emergency include a fire in an area where fires are common 
and there exists a proficient and well-resourced fire department, a moderate earthquake in 
an area predisposed to earthquakes and where the emergency services are accustomed 
and prepared to deal with the situation, or a hurricane in an hurricane zone where the 
public and public officials know how to prepare and are accustomed to preparing and 
responding to the event. No doubt these are all disastrous events. However, the expertise 
and knowledge on how to manage these situations is present, resources to do so are 
available and emergency actions are practiced and well understood. Categorizing a 
disaster as routine or crisis is highly dependent on the scope of the disaster. Clearly the 
Southeast Asia Tsunami, Hurricane Katrina, the Haiti Earthquake are examples where the 
scope of the problem exceeded the ability of the existing emergency response 
infrastructure, available resources, and invalidated standard responses (Gibbons, 2007). 
These disasters are more accurately categorized as crisis emergencies. 
In routine emergencies there exists a high level of understanding with regard to 
dealing with the emergency. Therefore, there are well-engineered scripts, highly defined 
skill sets, knowledgeable leaders and a well-established hierarchical command structure. 
By contrast, crisis emergencies rely on fluid response procedures with little scripting, 
unspecified skill sets, a more collaborative environment and less hierarchical command 
structure (Gibbons, 2007). In short, the response organization needs to be more agile and 
better prepared to deal effectively with quickly developing scenarios as they arise. 
Furthermore, they must be able to customize and improvise on short notice and in 
response to the evolving situation. Since the situation does not fit into the “norm” of 
routine emergencies, hierarchical leadership is not effective and first responders have no 
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choice but to work together in a collaborative environment and methodically work 
through discovering solutions to the emerging situation. While this is the reality faced by 
first responders in crisis emergencies, it is easier said than applied in real-world 
situations. The inherent mistrust between responding agencies, typically poor 
communications infrastructure and general chaos, combined with the general lack of 
understanding of how partner organizations operate, results in poor cooperation, 
inadequate sharing of information and ineffective coordination. 
B. APPLYING ROUTINE EMERGENCY PRINCIPLES TO CRISIS 
EMERGENCIES 
Many of the tragedies that have resulted from natural or man-made disasters can 
be categorized as recurrent, in other words, they are unpredictable in detail, but highly 
predictable in general pattern. Society has adapted to these predictable patterns and 
responded to these types of emergencies and catastrophes by instituting mitigating 
measures such as police departments, fire departments, emergency medical services, 
search and rescue, as well as disaster relief organizations, both private and governmental 
(Gibbons, 2007) . Establishment of these organizations arose from an identified need to 
better prepare to deal with these situations that history had taught society were inevitable. 
The same logic can be applied when preparing and responding to crisis emergencies. 
History has taught us, in the form of numerous disasters, that cooperation, coordination 
and collaboration between relief organizations is exceptionally difficult. Countless 
lessons learned from recent disasters have been written about the trials and tribulations 
faced by first responders. Nearly all of them describe similar difficulties in trying to 
respond to the disaster in a highly chaotic environment.   
Setting up reliable portable communications in this type of scenario is no 
different. Despite this knowledge, setting up communications after a disaster continues to 
be painfully difficult and erratic. The first responder community is well aware of the 
barriers to success that are present when disparate relief organizations come together to 
provide support. Every single relief organization is organized in a specific and unique 
manner that reflects the vision, goals and culture of that particular organization. The 
standard operating procedures are normally well known throughout that organization, 
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down to the specific relief individuals in the field. Furthermore, each organization utilizes 
its own procedures, protocol and technical equipment for communicating with their first 
responders. However, as we are well aware, responding to disasters requires trust, 
coordination and collaboration between those responding.  
In order to overcome the ever present roadblocks to effectively responding to 
crisis emergencies, perhaps we need to take a page from the steps society took to deal 
with routine emergencies. If the same difficulties are encountered in ensuing crisis 
emergencies, then relief agencies should be proactive in resolving the issues before the 
next disaster strikes. Therefore, the creation and employment of rapidly deployable and 
multi-agency manned portable communications teams could go a long way toward 
improving the assessment capability of the first responders. It would begin the crucial 
task of laying the communications foundation for follow-on relief resources. In a manner 
akin to Urban Search and Rescue, the proposed RTAT could be trained in the operation 
of the equipment and in overcoming the difficulties inherent in assessing ICT status and 
establishing portable communications in a quickly developing and complex environment.     
C. CURRENT STATUS OF THE POST DISASTER ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
The existing capabilities of the international humanitarian community to conduct 
post disaster assessment of ICT is very limited and disjointed. While some organizations 
have teams that are capable of deploying within 12–24 hours, their ICT assessment 
capabilities are very rudimentary. The primary reason for this is the fact that the majority 
of existing post disaster assessments focus on areas other than ICT, power and 
information sharing. The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination 
(UNDAC), the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) and the International 
Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent (IFRC) First Assessment and Coordination 
Teams (FACT) are all examples of existing disaster assessment teams. While each 
provides some assessment capability, their focus is primarily on sector specialty areas 
other than ICT and information sharing. Unfortunately, the IHC has been slow to realize 
the importance of the ICT sector as all other sectors in disaster relief are supported and 
enabled by it to some extent.   
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Difficulties in ICT are actually exacerbated by the arrival of the global response 
community. Their arrival provides a welcome and powerful ICT capacity; however, their 
ICT equipment and capabilities do not normally link effectively with the ICT of the host 
nation or each other. Inevitably, this leads to gaps and duplication of effort in the 
recovery process and poor distribution of available resources. The arrival of the global 
response community is not the only problem encountered in the early stages of the post 
disaster assessment effort. Often times the host nation has not initially requested 
assistance from the international community and has internally managed specific requests 
for assistance from the population. With the host nation’s government struggling to 
provide a semblance of order in the midst of chaos its resources are often stretched to the 
breaking point and it is unable to accurately assess ICT and power needs for the affected 
area. Not having a complete picture of the status of the ICT in the disaster zone results in 
a knowledge gap regarding the status of the ICT infrastructure and a lack of 
communication between the IHC and the host nation’s national infrastructure.  
With the affected nation and numerous international organizations each utilizing 
their own processes and assessment methods in an effort to accurately depict the situation 
and develop relief priorities, it is incredibly difficult to begin a coordinated approach to 
establishing a common situational overview of the ICT infrastructure. With numerous 
situational awareness tools and databases in use by different members of the IHC, it is 
nearly impossible to develop a Common Operating Picture (COP) that accurately and 
completely describes the situation in real-time. Therefore, the first responders must 
attempt the tedious and time-consuming task of compiling a COP from a hodgepodge of 
sources that are not capable of communicating with each other and utilize different 
semantics, ontologies, data definitions and processes.     
D. IMPROVING THE POST DISASTER ASSESSMENT PROCESS 
It has already been established that any single agency conducting a 
comprehensive assessment of the ICT situation is likely to fail due to a lack of resources 
and capability. Furthermore, conducting limited individual ICT assessments does not 
solve the issues of lack of interoperability and poor information sharing between 
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members of the IHC inherent in the current process. The RTAT concept seeks to provide 
a pool of multi-disciplinary experts who will rapidly deploy to the disaster zone to 
conduct the crucial task of assessing the status of the ICT in order to provide the host 
nation and the IHC with the latest information to quickly begin the recovery process. 
Assessing the ICT status is critical to obtaining targeted support that will enable rapid 
response, business recovery, and minimize the effects of the disaster on the affected 
population.   
The RTAT concept aims to achieve this through the creation of small, nimble, 
multi-organizational, multi-national integrated assessment teams of specialists in key ICT 
areas such as wireless data communications, voice communications, radio technologies, 
power, information sharing and social networking among others (Steckler, 2012). A key 
benefit to this proposed program is the membership make-up of the teams. The teams 
would consist of experts from a variety of different organizations that include industry, 
UN, NGOs, academia, International Organizations, host nation government/military, as 
well as international governments/militaries. Having this multi-organizational and multi-
national flavor to the teams will go a long way toward overcoming many of the 
difficulties encountered by the responding organizations in sharing information, 
collaborating and coordinating a unified response. Melding these experts with various 
backgrounds into a cohesive team with a very specific mission will allow for better 
understanding of how the individual organizations communicate and of the processes 
they utilize when responding to disasters. The desire is for this understanding to 
eventually lead to an increase in trust between the organizations of the IHC. With 
increased trust come improved information sharing, better collaboration and stronger 
cooperation, all of which lead to a more effective and efficient response effort. Working 
together in a small tight knit group will allow the individual RTAT members, also known 
as Netted Humanitarians, to act as informed liaisons to their parent organization. The 
benefits of building better relationships and increasing trust and understanding between 
members of the IHC cannot be understated.   
The primary goal of the RTAT is to establish a comprehensive overview of the 
ICT situation in the disaster zone and then develop a prioritized list of ICT needs 
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(Steckler, 2012). This list will be developed in coordination with the host nation. In the 
event that the host nation has not requested international assistance, it would be possible 
for the host nation to request the RTAT to provide specific and limited ICT disaster 
assessments. The teams will gather field data regarding communications technology and 
power needs that can be utilized by the host nation in its recovery efforts as well as by the 
IHC once/if those resources are mobilized. The gathered information can then be 
assessed for quality and usefulness by the experts on the team in order to prepare reliable 
and trusted information to follow-on responders from the IHC. By concentrating on the 
importance of human interfaces in collaboration, the Netted Humanitarians of RTAT will 
work to identify and find solutions to specific questions by compiling a common 
operational picture in order to link with the host nation and the IHC to enable an 
expeditious and effective recovery effort. The need to improve the current disaster 
response process is recognized by the response community. However, the need has not 
been adequately addressed. Creation and implementation of the RTAT concept is a 
proposal to address this need and the shortcomings of the practices of the current process. 
E. TEAM MAKEUP AND REQUIREMENTS 
The RTAT would ideally consist of 1–2 Netted Humanitarian representatives 
from each of the following types of organizations: UN, NGOs, IGOs, academia, industry, 
military and government agencies from around the world. In addition to being technically 
savvy in the operation of portable communications equipment, having experience in 
conducting interagency operations is a huge plus. This experience is crucial in order to 
allow for improved collaboration on action plans and coordination of their execution. 
Furthermore, the Netted Humanitarian needs to be skilled in the art of improvisation and 
experience in leading a decentralized social network with little to no hierarchical chain of 
command. The RTAT would be led by a Team Leader from the global humanitarian 
response and technical community and a senior member of the affected state, someone 
equivalent to the Head of the National Disaster Management Agency or the Ministry of 
Communications. The actual size of the team would be flexible and primarily determined 
by the scope of the disaster and the capabilities of the host nation in assessing ICT and 
power needs. Likewise, the skill sets of the Netted Humanitarians on the team would be 
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determined by the specific requirements of the disaster. The expectation is for the teams 
to be on stand-by ready to deploy within 12–24 hours, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 
365 days a year (Steckler, 2012). Furthermore, the likely deployment length would be 1–
2 weeks, again dependent on the needs of the affected nation. At this point, another 
RTAT could be deployed to relieve the initial team. 
F. VALUE ADDED TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY 
The importance placed by the USG on responding to disasters by conducting 
HA/DR missions is already well established. It is committed to making HA/DR a primary 
focus area and an important facet of its National Security Strategy (NSS). Given the 
invaluable skill set of its servicemembers, rapid deployment capabilities and the 
enormous material and personnel resources at its disposal, assisting in relief efforts is in 
many ways a natural fit for the military. However, given the era of fiscal austerity in 
which the United States finds itself, it is an absolute imperative that the USG utilizes its 
diminishing resources in a responsible yet effective manner. Most sources estimate that 
the DoD budget alone will be cut by approximately $450 to $500 billion over the next 
10 years (Crenshaw, 2012). Therefore, the USG simply cannot afford to be desultory in 
its response to future disasters. Additionally, it must develop a better understanding of 
and develop more intimate relationships with its NGO and IGO partners in the relief 
effort process. Placing increased emphasis on proactive networking, strategizing, and 
training before a disaster happens is critical to significantly enhancing the likelihood of a 
successful response. Integrating design principles for success under dynamic uncertainty 
with lessons learned from practical experience, responders may obtain guidelines for 
crisis management systems (Gibbons, 2007).   
For the civilian component of the IHC, learning to appreciate and cultivate 
relationships with military responders is equally important in order to better coordinate 
and collaborate on the relief efforts. Developing trust and overcoming existing barriers to 
collaboration is an ongoing process that will require patience and time to flourish. For 
most NGOs, disaster response is only one component of the services they provide. 
Therefore, after the onset of disaster many NGOs frequently turn to local, state and 
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federal entities for coordinating instructions. Some plan their own disaster recovery 
efforts, operating independently until they find partner through previous experience or at 
the disaster site (Gibbons, 2007).Without a doubt, nonprofit organizations provide the 
vast majority of hands-on disaster relief and recovery work. In nearly every disaster relief 
mission, they are present long after government agencies and the military have left. 
Despite this fact, the nonprofit organizations rely heavily on the military to provide 
physical security in dangerous disaster zones and to provide much needed heavy lift and 
transportation capabilities in the affected area. Without these important capabilities, the 
relief efforts of the NGO volunteers would be much slower and difficult to conduct. The 
bottom line is that NGOs and military responders need and rely upon one another to a 
large extent during a relief mission. 
The military maintains a reputation for getting the job done regardless of 
difficulties faced in any situation.  The HA/DR arena is no different. Despite this 
flexibility, a more structured approach is a dire necessity in order to improve the disaster 
response process. This approach must combine coordinated systems, procedures and the 
development of a COP with a supporting framework for improving crisis dialogue, 
planning and information exchange (Romano, 2011). The USG cannot achieve this by 
itself; the structured approach must be developed in conjunction with all of its partners in 
the disaster relief community. In a perfect situation, responses to crisis emergencies 
should consist of a network of complementary organizations working cooperatively 
toward shared goals.” (Gibbons, 2007)  However, reality is far from this perfect situation. 
Grasping the gravity of the disaster, ascertaining the relief requirements and properly 
allocating available resources is always incredibly challenging in an HA/DR mission. 
It is this uncertainty and difficulty in collaboratively responding to disasters that 
Netted Humanitarians and RTAT are designed to address and overcome. For example, 
while USG HA/DR planners, logisticians and responders are likely to have access to a 
variety of asset visibility tools, the tools they utilize exclude visibility of assets 
maintained by other USG agencies and NGOs. This deficiency leads to a lack of 
coordinated response due to the lack of visibility over available assets and the lack of 
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understanding of the material distribution plans of individual organizations. The outcome 
is possible duplication of effort and wasted resources.   
Furthermore, much of the collaboration and planning within the military takes 
place in classified forums, which excludes key interagency and NGO organizations from 
fully participating and collaborating in the relief efforts. This points to a need to improve 
information sharing and to develop shared and open tools to better organize, source and 
deliver relief supplies. Coordination, from previous evidence, occurs most reliably with 
timely, accurate information search and exchange processes. In short, without open and 
effective communication, coordination is likely to fail (Gibbons, 2007). Finally, it is 
critical for the participants in disaster planning and response to include people from all 
stakeholder groups, including public and private organizations, NGOs, federal and state 
government agencies, military, as well as community groups. The structure and team 
makeup of RTAT is specifically designed to address this important requirement. Since 
the Netted Humanitarians come from a variety of organizations and backgrounds, 
coordination and information sharing are facilitated, allowing for better collaboration and 
intelligent use of the aggregate talents and abilities of the team. 
 Another cog in the coordination and collaboration difficulties encountered by 
responding organizations are differences in leadership and decision-making structure. 
Nowhere is this difference more visible and readily apparent than in the coordination 
efforts between United States military and NGO responders. The military is almost 
exclusively hierarchically driven, and military members always want to know who is in 
charge. Military leadership and decision-making is top-down driven, and in most cases 
rank is the most important attribute in getting anything done. Coordination is also 
conducted in a very specific procedural manner and is highly linear in nature; for 
example logisticians will deal only with other logisticians. While military humanitarian 
responders agree to follow the Chain of Command, NGOs zealously guard their separate 
identities, cultures and manner of operating. Utilizing a more decentralized decision-
making model allows them to work toward the accomplishment of common relief goals 
without having to give up their separate identities (Denning, 2006). 
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In the chaotic environment in which HFNs operate, lateral communication and 
decentralized control among competent responders enables rapid, effective action. On the 
flip side, hierarchical coordination has a tendency to limit lateral communication, 
collaborative problem solving and adaptation. Employing decentralized coordination, 
where all participants in the relief efforts are able to coordinate directly with others, 
results in more fluid and ongoing access to information from all sources and facilitates 
collaborative problem solving, resource sharing, innovation, and adaptation. Within an 
emergency response team, organic system design that incorporates decentralized 
communications, joint problem solving, and autonomous decision making actually 
increases performance. When dealing with uncertainty organizations must be flexible and 
highly adaptable. Lateral communications help first responders know which actions to 
take and how they can accomplish the most good with the available resources (Gibbons, 
2007). 
Once disaster strikes, the relief process is absolutely dependent on multiple 
organizations transforming from autonomous actors into interdependent decision-making 
teams. Implementing the concept of Netted Humanitarians that operate in multi-
organizational teams could go a long way to addressing many of the obstacles faced by 
first responders. Netted Humanitarians as members of an RTAT are critical to proactive 
network building, conducting strategic planning, and training first responders to 
cooperate in a chaotic situation. A network that supports rapid information transfer 
without overloading individuals with unnecessary information is ideal (Gibbons, 2007). 
This goal requires a stable infrastructure and trained personnel schooled in the operation 
of the HFN equipment. 
G. TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT 
The following section focuses on outlining some of the currently available 
communications technology that could be paired with first responders on RTAT in order 
to carry out the post-disaster assessment. This section does not intend to be an 
advertisement for any specific product or company. It simply aims to identify and 
describe some of the technology and gear that is available for use by the Netted 
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Humanitarian in carrying out their duties. If the concept of RTAT is ever implemented, 
its success will be highly dependent on having the resources and equipment to 
accomplish the humanitarian mission and thereby increasing the success of the IHC in 
conducting post-disaster assessments. This is by no means the be-all end-all list of 
equipment or technology that can be utilized within the spectrum of RTAT operations. 
With the rapid pace at which technology is improving it is vitally important to keep 
abreast of the latest improvements. One of the suggestions for future research on this 
topic is to continually monitor the technological landscape for innovative and clever ways 
to combine emerging and existing technologies into a more robust and capable FLAK for 
Netted Humanitarians. As for the Netted Humanitarians themselves, they must be skilled 
and knowledgeable in the setup and operation of mobile communication and sensor 
systems. 
1. Satellite Communications (SATCOM) 
Lessons learned have taught us that access to reliable communications saves lives 
and plays a crucial role for disaster victims, first responders, relief workers, and national 
and local governments (ViaSat, 2012). In areas where wireless and terrestrial 
infrastructure are unavailable, damaged, or overloaded, satellite communications may be 
the only viable way to re-establish Internet connectivity communications. Satellite 
systems offer redundancy and reliability that when effectively leveraged are capable of 
circumventing the often catastrophic destruction or degradation of the ground-based 
communications infrastructure of the affected area. Additionally, these satellite 
communications systems must be portable and simple to operate, and be able to quickly 
establish a reliable high-speed uplink. Antenna pointing aids for rapid satellite acquisition 
as well as simple and reliable installation that involves minimal training are highly 
desirable attributes. Access to real-time, situational information, plus the relaying of 
photos, video, and assessment of local conditions, provides decision-makers the tools 
they need to support on-the-ground response and recovery efforts. The temporary 
infrastructure provides Internet as well as secure VPN data, voice, and video services and 
can remain in place for days or weeks, as the situation requires (Viasat, 2012). 
Additionally, the equipment must be ruggedized to support operation in harsh conditions 
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and needs to support multiple configuration options to suit varying user needs. The 
complete system, including the satellite terminal and antenna, should be able to be 
packed into one or two cases for transit and must remain lightweight enough to be airline 
luggage checkable and carried by a single user.    
a. BGAN 
Developed by INMARSAT as a secure and reliable satellite 
communications network with global coverage, the Broadband Global Area Network 
(BGAN) is ideal for use by the Netted Humanitarian in a HA/DR scenario. Its lightweight 
form factor, fast connection speeds and the fact that it requires little technical expertise or 
training to operate make it exceptionally user friendly. Since all BGAN terminals are 
“plug and play,” the user can be online within minutes. This is a key feature for the 
Netted Humanitarians of the RTAT since they need to be highly mobile and having the 
capability for rapid connectivity is absolutely critical. When conducting post disaster 
assessments in a chaotic environment the last thing a Netted Humanitarian needs to worry 
about is setting up a complicated piece of equipment. As far as portability, smaller 
BGAN models such as the Hughes 9202 weigh just over 3 pounds and easily fit inside a 
backpack (Hughes, 2012). Despite its small size, the Hughes 9202 is capable of 
broadcasting a Wi-Fi signal within a 100 meter circumference area in addition to having 
an RJ45 connector for direct connection (Hughes, 2012). Additionally, as seen in Figure 
1, the Hughes 9202 is also capable of fitting inside a small protective case (smaller than 
2 foot by 2 foot) complete with space for a laptop computer and phone handset. 
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Figure 1.  BGAN in Hardened Case  
Despite packing a lot of performance into a small package, the BGAN 
does have limitations and drawbacks. The primary drawback is that the cost required to 
use the BGAN is higher than other portable SATCOM devices such as the Very Small 
Aperture Terminal (VSAT). The approximate cost for a BGAN device ranges from 
$2500 to $7000, depending on the make, model and features. BGANs have a high cost of 
service primarily due to the data plans offered, which are based on data usage vice flat 
monthly fees. The current rates are between $2.50 and $7.50 per megabyte depending on 
volume purchased (Inmarsat, 2012). Furthermore, BGAN connectivity can become 
degraded when the number of users is high. This scenario was experienced during the 
relief efforts for the Haiti earthquake in 2010. Haiti BGAN users experienced significant 
degradation of service due to the number of units deployed, especially during peak hours 
of use. In Haiti, this was between 5–7 PM eastern standard time when TV networks 
broadcasted the nightly news via Skype. Also, the BGAN runs on Subscriber Identity 
Module (SIM) cards that can only be utilized for a designated amount of download 
bandwidth. Unfortunately, this bandwidth can be quickly maxed out, which creates the 
need to carry multiple SIM cards. Additionally, like all SATCOM devices, the BGAN 
requires Line of Sight (LOS) to the satellite. This can be a challenge when operating in 
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urban environments with many buildings or in highly forested areas with thick tree cover. 
Moreover, since BGAN technology operates in the L frequency band (1.5 to 1.6 GHz), it 
is susceptible to degradation in heavy rain and other types of precipitation. Finally, the 
BGAN is limited in bandwidth (256~400 kbps) and thus can become overburdened and 
provide slow connections speeds if more than 2–3 users are connected at once. However, 
it is quite adequate for a single user or small team looking for an easy to use and reliable 
gateway that provides reach-back capability. 
b. VSAT 
Another technology with possible applications for use by members of the 
RTAT is the Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT). Similar in many ways to a BGAN, 
VSATs also come in a variety of sizes and weights but generally have a higher 
throughput than BGAN units. The higher throughput provides several advantages. For 
example, VSATs are capable of supporting much better speed video uplinks and can 
accommodate more users without increased latency. This is a highly desirable trait for the 
Netted Humanitarian as it is highly conceivable that they would be recording surveillance 
video of the on-the-ground situation for transmission back to the C2 center or utilizing 
COTS technology such as Skype. Furthermore, some VSATs are capable of using 
multiple radio bands such as X, C, Ka and Ku and can connect to an assortment of 
satellites. This capability provides the user with added flexibility and gives them access 
to high speed bands such as the Ka band. 
Though not as user friendly or simple to use as a BGAN, they are simple 
enough to set up that most users will be online in less than 10 minutes. Some models, 
such as the Viasat SurfBeam 2 Pro Portable, come in a relatively small and ruggedized 
form factor. When disassembled, the Pro Portable fits inside a modest sized case which 
can be checked in as baggage on commercial airplane flights (See Figure 2). The Pro 
Portable also contains a four-port Ethernet router and an optional battery pack, which 
provides up to four hours of power. Despite its small dimensions it is still capable of 
impressive performance standards, offering up to 40 Mbps download and 20 Mbps 
upload speeds (ViaSat, 2012). Just as important, the Pro Portable is designed to be set up 
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and operated by one individual. VSAT equipment in this man-portable auto-acquire rapid 
deployment class costs in the vicinity of $20,000 (Honig, 2012). Service for VSAT is 
normally a flat rate monthly fee based on upload/download speeds. 
 
Figure 2.  ViaSat Surfbeam 2 Pro Portable VSAT (From Honig, 2012) 
c. RO Tactical Radio–“Netted Iridium” 
Two of the most important technology requirements for any gear 
associated with the Netted Humanitarian are simplicity of use and reliable voice 
communications. Time is of the essence in disaster relief. This is especially true in the 
early assessment phase within the 12–24 hour window after a disaster has occurred. 
While a BGAN or VSAT provides the critical link to the Internet backbone, they require 
setup and a moderate level of operator proficiency. In contrast, the RO Tactical Radios 
developed by NexGen Communications operate at the push of a button to provide critical 
satellite based Push-To-Talk (PTT) voice communications. Obviously, there are times 
when the higher bandwidth and increased capabilities of a BGAN or VSAT are 
necessary, but there are other occasions when quick and secure satellite communications 
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at the push of a button are more desirable. The RO Tactical Radio is simple for the 
operator to use, operating in a fashion similar to a secure “walkie-talkie” (Figure 3). By 
utilizing the Iridium satellite constellation the radio requires no ground infrastructure. 
With the PTT feature, the operator has the ability to communicate with thousands of 
other RO Tactical Radios within a 100–250 mile radius (Exelis, 2012). The radios are 
also equipped with an embedded GPS receiver, which utilizes the same antenna used for 
voice communications. Another useful function provided by the radio is its ability to 
transmit encrypted Position Location Information (PLI) in either Global or Regional 
mode. Global mode transmits PLI data securely from anywhere in the world to the DoD 
Gateway. Regional mode transmits data to multiple RO Tactical Radios configured to 
operate in Data Collector mode. This feature provides local personnel awareness of 
friendly forces. 
 
Figure 3.  NexGen RO Tactical Radio (From Exelis, 2012) 
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The RO Tactical Radio is part of the Distributed Tactical Communications 
System (DTCS) which is managed by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).    
The DTCS is a satellite communications system that incorporates Iridium satellite 
technology, software and commercial GPS (Exelis, 2012). Additionally, DTCS provides 
Beyond-Line-of-Sight (BLOS), Over-the-Horizon (OTH), and On-the-Move, one-to-
many tactical voice and data communications. The RO Tactical Radio, or “Netted 
Iridium” as it is also known, is currently in use by U.S. military forces in Afghanistan as 
a secure voice communications and Command and Control (C2) tool. While designed for 
military use, the Netted Iridium system could easily be applied for humanitarian use by 
an RTAT. The RTAT Team Leader would have a powerful PTT voice communication 
tool that allows them to seamlessly and quickly communicate with individual Netted 
Humanitarians deployed throughout the disaster zone. Furthermore, using the PLI 
capability, the RTAT Team Leader would possess a powerful C2 tool that would provide 
visibility over the status and location of the individual Netted Humanitarians. This would 
allow the Team Leader to redistribute and reallocate his resources as the situation 
changes. For the Netted Humanitarians, the PTT feature affords the ability to 
communicate with each other simultaneously as long as they are in the same talk group, 
as well as with the C2 cell with ease and simplicity and in a small form factor. 
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4, there are large number of peripherals that would 
allow the operator to tailor the radio kit for maximum efficiency depending on specific 
needs and mission requirements. The only significant training that would be required by 
RTAT personnel would be learning to configure the radios to proper voice nets, 
encryption keys and PLI settings.   The primary drawback to utilizing the system in 
HA/DR missions is the cost of the radios themselves, which are priced at approximately 
$4500 plus the costs of any ancillary equipment purchased, such as car mounts, 
headphones and handsets (Exelis, 2012). Service costs currently run at a flat monthly rate 
of $90 per radio (Exelis, 2012). However, despite the cost, the system provides a 




Figure 4.  NexGen RO Tactical Radio Peripherals (From Exelis, 2012) 
d. DeLorme inReach Two Way Satellite Communicator 
Considering the chaotic nature of the disaster zone in the immediate 
aftermath of a natural disaster, the safety of first responders always needs to be a concern. 
Conducting an initial assessment often requires first responders to enter destroyed 
buildings and other infrastructure and to be deployed to dangerous and/or lawless regions 
within the disaster area. In situations such as these, a portable communication tool that 
can quickly and easily be used by a first responder to send an SOS emergency message or 
to forward critical status updates could prove beneficial in conducting early assessments. 
The DeLorme inReach is a two-way satellite communicator that is roughly the same size 
and weight as a smartphone. It utilizes the Iridium satellite constellation, which provides 
worldwide coverage. In addition to having a small form factor (Figure 5), the inReach 
communicator is waterproof, buoyant and impact resistant. All are highly desirable traits 
to have in a disaster zone. It is powered by 2 AA batteries, with a tested battery life of 




Figure 5.  DeLorme inReach Two-Way Satellite Communicator  
(From DeLorme, 2011) 
The inReach communicator can be operated in stand-alone mode, or it can 
be paired via Bluetooth technology with an Android or IPhone smartphone, or with the 
DeLorme PN-60w handheld GPS. In stand-alone mode it is capable of sending up to 
three preloaded messages and has an SOS button for emergency assistance with a 
delivery confirmation feature for all sent messages. The user also has the ability to enable 
or disable remote tracking. The remote tracking feature can be set to update the user’s 
position at a variety of time intervals, or can be disabled in order to save battery life. 
Utilizing remote tracking allows colleagues and early responders to have access to the 
route taken by the user for informational or emergency purposes. When paired with the 
DeLorme PN-60w handheld GPS device the device is capable of text messaging to email 
addresses or cell phones up to a maximum of 160 characters per message (DeLorme, 
2011). Furthermore, this mode provides Interactive SOS capability, which allows the user 
to describe the situation in detail in order to improve emergency response and to stay in 
touch with the GEOS International Emergency Response Coordination Center (IERCC). 
Though obviously not as robust as the RO Tactical Radio, the inReach still provides a 
useful capability that could be utilized by Netted Humanitarians in their mission. 
Additionally, the cost for the units is a fraction of the cost of the RO Tactical Radio. If 
money is an area of concern when outfitting the RTAT Netted Humanitarians, than 
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inReach is a much more palatable option. The units cost approximately $250 each, plus 
another $275 for the handheld GPS when utilized in that mode (DeLorme, 2011).  On the 
down side, the company does not currently offer any pay as you go plans. Instead, 
DeLorme offers seasonal or annual plans that begin at $9.99 a month (DeLorme, 2011).    
e. Satellite Phones 
One of the most commonly used and trusted tools for those who need to 
communicate from remote locations is the satellite phone. Consequently, the satellite 
phone is very applicable to the mission of first responders. With terrestrial cell antenna 
tower and networks normally heavily damaged or destroyed by a natural disaster, satellite 
phones are often an indispensable and proven communications tool during disaster relief. 
The Netted Humanitarians of RTAT are likely to appreciate the small size and portability 
of the satellite phone, in addition the ruggedized and small form factor of the devices. 
Satellite phones come in a variety of shapes and sizes and manufacturers offer a variety 
of models in order to meet the varying needs of customers. Two of the largest providers 
of satellite phones are Inmarsat and Iridium. 
Inmarsat is the oldest satellite phone service operator and provides 
coverage via 3 geostationary satellites. Like all geostationary satellites, they suffer from a 
lack of coverage in the Polar Regions (above 70 degrees north and below 70 degrees 
south latitude) due to the extreme look angles and higher probability of interference. This 
is offset by the higher bandwidth available from geostationary satellites with connection 
speeds of 60–512 kbps. Models such as the Inmarsat IsatPhone Pro (Figure 6) offer a 
robust handset that can be operated in a multitude of weather conditions, is GPS enabled, 
voice and messaging capable, and has a battery life of up to 8 hours of talk time and 100 
hours on standby (Inmarsat, 2012). Unit cost for this model is approximately $555 with a 
choice of either monthly or pay-as-you-go service plans (Inmarsat, 2012). Monthly 
service plans run between $30 and $60 depending on the number of minutes purchased 
(Inmarsat, 2012). Pay-as-you-go plan costs depend on the number of pre-paid units 
purchased and validity period of the units, current rates range from approximately  
$1–$1.75 per unit (Inmarsat, 2012).  
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Figure 6.  Inmarsat IsatPhone Pro Handset 
Iridium, on the other hand, operates a constellation of 66 Low Earth Orbit 
(LEO) satellites (Iridium, 2012). LEO satellites offer several advantages over 
geostationary satellite systems; most noticeable is that they can provide true worldwide 
coverage including the Polar Regions. Additionally, LEO systems are able to track a 
mobile unit’s location by using Doppler shifts between the satellite and the mobile unit. 
Iridium’s Extreme Satellite Phone (Figure 7) is comparable to other higher end satellite 
phone models. A convenient feature offered by this model is the addition of an SOS 
button that transmits directly to the GEOS IERCC. Unit cost for this model is 
approximately $1375 with a choice of monthly and pay-as-you-go plans (Iridium, 2012). 
Monthly service plans cost approximately $40 which average out to airtime charges of 
$1.08 per minute (Iridium, 2012. Pay as you go airtime charges on the other hand average 




Figure 7.  Iridium Extreme Satellite Phone 
Despite the advantages offered by satellite phones with regard to 
portability, ease of use and worldwide coverage, they do suffer from certain limitations. 
Satellite phone networks are often prone to congestion as satellites and spot beams have a 
tendency to cover a large geographic area and offer relatively few voice channels. This 
reality is magnified post-disaster when the number of satellite phone users increases 
exponentially. Additionally, airtime charges, especially for data transmission are very 
expensive unless the user has signed up for a pre-paid plan. Finally, satellite phones are 
notorious for having short battery lives, which can quickly become a problem to a Netted 
Humanitarian trying to remain lightweight while conducting assessments on foot. 
2. Data Fusion Software 
The difficulties encountered by the IHC in attempting to share and integrate 
information that originates from numerous data sources are well documented. Identifying 
software solutions that are capable of finding useful connections in disparate data sources 
needs to be a priority for the IHC and the USG. Neither entity can afford to continue 
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down the current path of wasteful and inefficient allocation of resources and continued 
lack of interoperability that is rampant in the current disaster response process. A firm 
that has made significant progress in developing data fusion software is Palantir 
Technologies. Taking its name from the magical all-seeing crystal balls of J.R.R. 
Tolkien’s mythology, Palantir was founded by a group of PayPal alumni and backed by 
Peter Thiel, one of PayPal’s co-founders (“Big data: Crunching the numbers,” n.d.). Data 
fusion is a multilevel, multifaceted process dealing with the automatic detection, 
association, correlation, estimation, and combination of data and information from single 
and multiple sources (Koks & Challa, 1994). Palantir specializes in building data fusion 
systems that gather information from different sources and then attempts to find 
connections that can be utilized by the user to answer questions. Among the first 
customers to utilize the software were the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), who utilize it to connect individually innocuous 
activities such as taking flying lessons and receiving money from abroad to spot potential 
terrorists (“Big data: Crunching the numbers,” n.d.).  
Having an open Application Programming Interface (API) is one of the most 
attractive attributes of the Palantir software. An API is a language and message format 
used by an application program to communicate with the operating system or some other 
control program such as a database management system (DBMS) or communications 
protocol. By containing an open API, Palantir has allowed its data fusion software 
platforms to serve as the foundation for developing whole new applications. The 
importance of this in the context of HA/DR cannot be understated. The issues faced in 
sharing information and achieving data fusion between responding organizations is well 
known. Even if the responding agencies are able to break through organizational barriers 
and are willing to share information, there is often incredible difficulty encountered in 
fusing data from various sources into a comprehensible and accurate Common Operating 
Picture (COP). Each relief agency maintains its own databases and utilizes a unique IT 
architecture that does not allow for ease in information sharing. Middleware like Palantir 
is capable of circumventing this issue by becoming the data integration layer for the 
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HFN. This capability allows the HFN to make sense of the massive amounts of disparate 
data available from multiple information sources.  
It is very important for application developers to include an API which provides a 
means for requesting program services. Building an application with no API is akin to 
building a house with no doors. The API for computing purposes is how you open the 
blinds and the doors and exchange information. As time goes by, the likelihood that 
another developer will need to tap an application’s services increases. Data fusion 
software like that developed by Palantir must have an open API in order for future 
applications to be able to interface with it. With the rapid pace at which technology is 
improving, this design feature is imperative. As new applications continue to be 
developed, being able to integrate in a “plug and play” manner with existing IT 
infrastructure is crucial. This is even more important in an HFN environment that finds it 
nearly impossible to agree on standardization of processes, software protocols, semantics, 
data structures, and data warehousing.     
Utilizing data fusion software allows for HFN users to ask the questions that deal 
with the status, requirements and available resources for responding to the disaster, 
without having to go through the slow and tedious process of data mining through 
mountains of information from disparate sources. Using this type of software utilizes the 
processing power of computers to figure out how to query numerous databases and bring 
back valuable data in a coherent form to the responders. Having an open API allows for 
applications developed in the future to more easily integrate with the software. As 
HA/DR organizations focus on developing application tools to make their relief efforts 
easier, they can rest assured that the data fusion software they want to operate with will 
allow them easy access.   
 45
 
Figure 8.  Representation of Palantir Data Fusion Software (From Palantir, 2012) 
3. Additional FLAK Equipment 
In addition to the variety of primary communications equipment available for use 
by the Netted Humanitarian, other important items are required to round out the FLAK. 
While this additional equipment could be considered secondary in nature, its importance 
to the mission of the RTAT Netted Humanitarians cannot be understated. 
One of the largest areas of concerns for first responders when deployed to the 
disaster zone is the availability of power sources. There is a very high likelihood that the 
power infrastructure of the affected area will be unavailable or severely degraded. For 
this reason, having portable power sources available to run electrical equipment is of 
utmost importance to the Netted Humanitarian. The power source must be lightweight 
and portable in addition to having the ability to power the communications equipment for 
extended periods of time. First responders require a variety of inputs and outputs to 
include 12V ports, USB ports, and AC outlets to power their gear. Additionally, rapid 
charging solar power panels and power inverters are crucial. These requirements make 
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portable solar charger kits that combine these capabilities, such as the Goal Zero Extreme 
Explorer Kit (Figure 9), an indispensable tool for first responders.  
 
Figure 9.  Goal Zero Extreme Explorer Kit  
Other gear that should be included in the Netted Humanitarian FLAK includes: 
 Hands free recordable camera with live-streaming capability 
 Tactical Communications Vest 
 Gear Bag Expedition-type 
 Ruggedized laptop 
 Ancillary support equipment (Cat-5 cable, batteries, flashlight, headlamps, 
etc.). 
H. MOVING TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION  
The technology and equipment described in this chapter provides a great amount 
of flexibility in the FLAK options available to the Netted Humanitarian. Furthermore, the 
rapid pace of technological development ensures that newer technology will continue to 
redefine the capabilities of the Netted Humanitarian. In addition, this chapter clearly 
established the urgent requirement for a rapidly deployable and self-sufficient ICT 
assessment team. The next chapter will focus on taking the vision of the Netted 
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Humanitarian from the conceptual stage to actual implementation. Finally, the following 
chapter will describe three concrete examples that outline the resulting improvement in 
the ICT assessment process that can be expected from RTAT and the Netted 
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTING PROCESS 
IMPROVEMENT 
One of the roadblocks to making RTAT a reality is that the idea will not transcend 
from a theoretical idea to actual implementation. This would be an unfortunate turn of 
events and would miss out on the opportunity to more effectively integrate and capitalize 
on the combined talent and experience of the first responder community. After action 
report reviews that are held to assess the performance following devastating events 
repeatedly call for a stronger coordination among agencies engaged in disaster 
operations. Such coordination cannot occur without an effective process of 
communication. Communication has both technical and social components, each 
affecting the other and producing potential failure as well as probable strength. Failure in 
technical systems of communication almost certainly triggers failure in organizational 
performance under the rapidly changing condition of disaster (Gibbons, 2007). 
This section describes a possible manner in which the vision of RTAT and Netted 
Humanitarians can become a reality in the future. What is described in this section is 
merely a possible roadmap that stakeholders can utilize to implement RTAT with the 
goal of improving the current disaster assessment process. The proposed implementation 
solution is focused on improving current shortfalls in the disaster response arena and is 
based on case studies and lessons learned from recent disasters. The aforementioned case 
studies and lessons learned have repeatedly enumerated and described in detail 
shortcomings of the current assessment process as well as the difficulties faced by first 
responders from across the IHC. Examples of these shortcomings, and how RTAT and 
the Netted Humanitarian concepts can help overcome them, are detailed in this section.   
A. IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSAL 
1. Stakeholder Involvement 
Disaster response organizations agree almost unanimously that a better early 
disaster assessment process is needed in order to provide relief to those in need in a 
quicker and more effective manner. However, despite the numerous benefits to disaster 
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response offered by better collaboration, cooperation and sharing of information, 
convincing multiple organizations to follow through with wholesale organizational 
change is indeed a difficult and daunting task. No one wants to change their internal 
processes, organizational culture and identity in the hopes that this might lead to a better 
disaster response process. A more palatable and realistic goal is to engage and convince 
organizations of the value added by simply providing a small number of SME personnel, 
perhaps some funding, and most importantly, organizational support for multi-
organizational early ICT assessment teams, e.g., RTAT.  
A critical component to garnering organizational support from stakeholders is to 
clearly illustrate the importance the RTAT ICT assessment report will play in facilitating 
the relief efforts of their organization and the IHC as a whole. The list of possible 
stakeholders that should be included in the development and implementation of RTAT 
includes a number of USG agencies, NGOs, United Nations-Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), United Nations-World Food Program (UN-WFP), 
philanthropic organizations, academia, and communications industry representatives. 
Input could also be solicited from nations that have a higher propensity for dealing with 
natural disasters, and whose military and government disaster relief agency has 
experience in dealing with the relief process from the perspective of the affected nation. 
This stakeholder input will also provide a forum to discuss individual concerns and more 
clearly delineate the manner in which the RTAT will operate prior to deploying to the 
disaster zone. Usually this type of planning is done during relief efforts when the 
situation is chaotic and organizations are scrambling to create ad-hoc networks and are 
attempting to cooperate concurrently while assessing the ICT needs of the affected area. 
That is not the ideal situation. 
2. Proposed Working Groups 
Once stakeholders recognize the value added by RTAT and are invested in the 
development process they can progress to the creation of working groups for specific 
topics related to implementation. While the vision for RTAT is a new concept, there is a 
plethora of reference material and similar functional groups or operations that can help 
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guide the individual working groups through the development process. These include the 
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) Field Operations Guide (FOG) and the 
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) handbook. Falling 
under the purview of the Office of Foreign U.S. Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the primary 
purpose of a DART is to conduct an initial assessment in order to provide OFDA with 
information and recommendations to make timely decisions on the USG disaster 
response. These references have been developed as tools for individuals to utilize if they 
are sent to disaster sites to undertake initial assessments. Furthermore, the information 
presented in them is drawn from first-hand experience gained by responders in real-world 
disaster relief missions. Proposed working groups for RTAT development will now be 
described in greater detail. 
a. Qualifications 
This working group would be concerned with outlining the desired 
qualifications for the Netted Humanitarians that would compose the RTAT. All 
candidates need to be experts in the operation and maintenance of portable 
communications equipment. Furthermore, extensive real-world experience in responding 
to a natural disaster is a highly desirable trait. This working group would also be 
responsible for delineating the manner in which possible team members are chosen, 
either through an active recruitment and application process or via nomination to the 
team by the parent organization. Desirable qualification for prospective Netted 
Humanitarians includes the operation of satellite communications equipment, portable 
cellular networks, PTT radios and portable power generation equipment. 
b. Training 
The training working group would be responsible for designing the 
training curriculum for team members. This would include outlining the pre-requisite 
skill sets, training objectives and the learning times that would be devoted to each 
objective. A key area of responsibility for this working group would be designing 
coordinated training scenarios or exercises to test the knowledge and actions of the team 
in a field environment. A possible option to meet this requirement is the identification of 
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existing HA/DR exercises, or other large exercises with an HA/DR component to the 
scenario, during which the team could deploy and learn to collaborate in a more realistic 
environment. Coordinating with USG and/or international organizations to identify and 
participate in these types of exercises would be a key area of responsibility for the 
working group. The training working group would also have to stipulate standards for 
training, technology and equipment standards as well as prerequisites for not IT-field 
related training and certification requirements such as First-Aid and National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS). 
c. Team Structure 
Identifying the optimal team structure is dependent on the size, 
complexity, type, and location of the disaster and the needs of the affected country. The 
number of individuals assigned to a RTAT is determined by how many people are 
required to perform the necessary activities to meet the goals and objectives. Maintaining 
flexibility in team structure and identifying metrics to better match team strength to 
scenario type will be a key area of focus for this working group. Moreover, developing 
multiple team structures that correctly match individual SME skills with the magnitude 
and type of disaster faced by responders is crucial to the success of RTAT. Additionally, 
support personnel situated away from the disaster zone would be critical in order to more 
easily manage requests, resourcing and logistics as required. 
d. Terms of Reference 
Organizational and individual member terms of reference are a major 
requirement in order to make the vision of RTAT a reality. The organizational terms of 
reference should be very specific and describe in detail the mission and purpose of 
RTAT. This working group would be responsible for crafting a road map for what will be 
accomplished, by whom, how and when. Furthermore, the terms of reference should 
define the vision and mission, goals, structure, available resources, standards, and 
timelines. The value in developing terms of reference for the RTAT lies primarily in 
developing a shared understanding of what it hopes to accomplish in order to develop 
workable structures and clearly defined action plans. With regard to individual terms of 
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reference it is important that the roles and responsibilities of each of the RTAT members 
are clearly delineated and well defined in order to provide clarity to the team members. 
The final product of this working group will be the RTAT Project Charter, which will 
become a living document for future iterations of RTAT.  
e. Funding 
Probably the most critical subject matter for stakeholders to deliberate and 
achieve some level of consensus on is the mechanism for funding RTAT. Without an 
agreed upon method for funding RTAT deployment, there is little likelihood that RTAT 
will ever progress past the conceptual stage. There are numerous existing funding 
structures for this working group to draw from when formulating a funding plan. One that 
could definitely apply and holds promise is the UNDAC Model. Under this model, 
countries are separated into members and participating nations. UNDAC member 
countries are those countries that provide financial assets in support of their participation 
in the program. They do this by depositing funds in UN-OCHA “mission accounts” to 
cover the deployment costs of their national UNDAC members while on a UNDAC 
deployment (UN-OCHA, 2013). Meanwhile, participating nations provide experts to 
deploy with the UNDAC team but do not cover the costs of their deployment, which is 
covered by voluntary contributions of donor countries (UN-OCHA, 2013). Standard 
deposits into mission accounts are $50K and cover the cost of travel and daily allowances 
for hotel, food and incidentals (UN-OCHA, 2013).   
Attaining support and cooperation from UN-OCHA with regard to funding 
could be critical for the members of the funding working group. This support would be a 
significant milestone and would allow for a trusted and respected player in the IHC to 
provide a sense of legitimacy for RTAT and its stakeholders. With significant experience 
in managing travel arrangements and accommodations on the ground in disaster zones, 
UN-OCHA already has an existing infrastructure for funding deployments. This includes 
a mechanism where notifications are sent to the respective country or NGO when funding 
reaches a certain level, informing them that their mission account is low on funds (UN-
OCHA, 2013). Of particular concern for RTAT is ensuring that funding is sufficient to 
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cover the high cost of communications equipment and utilization rates for BGAN and 
VSAT. Finally, training costs are critical to fund, for both the initial and refresher 
training the team members would require. 
f. Assessment Forms 
Since RTAT personnel are likely to be among the first responders on the 
ground in the disaster zone, the results of their ICT assessment will provide crucial 
information to the IHC in the ensuing days following the disaster. Therefore, their 
assessment forms need to be designed in such a manner that they can convey important 
information that is easily understood by first responders from an assortment of 
responding organizations. This working group would be responsible for standardizing the 
assessment forms the team would utilize in the field. They should also ensure they 
coordinate with the training working group in order to ensure that use of the assessment 
forms is part of the training curriculum and is also utilized during training exercises. 
Since the forms are concerned with annotating the status of the ICT infrastructure, there 
should be multiple forms designed for different types of communications systems that 
need to be assessed for capability. These include the post-disaster status of satellite 
communications (VSAT, BGAN, Satellite Phone), terrestrial communications (copper, 
fiber optic, DSL, Cable, T-1, ISDN), cellular and wireless communications and 
conventional radio communications (HF, VHF, UHF, AM/FM broadcast). 
In an effort to easily compile and maintain the information gathered using 
these forms, members of this working group should ensure that electronic versions are 
available for use by Netted Humanitarians. The gathered information would then need to 
be stored and organized in a manner that allows for the maximum level of information 
sharing between responding organizations. The goal would be to have the RTAT C2 site 
become a central coordination center for follow-on humanitarian responders to utilize in 
order to collaborate on restoring the ICT infrastructure to assist overall recovery efforts. 
Figures 10 to 14 are an example of an RTAT assessment form for cellular and wireless 




Figure 10.  Cellular/Wireless Assessment Form (1 of 4) 





4 Government legislative body
Market Information
5 % of Mobile Phones in country:
6 Approximate number of towers:
Services Y/N
7 SMS 







15 Mobile Banking If Y What Partner




19 NOC Location & Notes
20
Note structural/building 
characteristics that may be 
relevant, power, redundant 
comms








Emergency TOR or LOI 
established with other 
parties?
25 SMS Gateways





Would be willing to 
collaborate on deploying 
emergency-related VASs?
31
Possibility to obtain real time 
coverage maps during 
Disasters
32
Would be willing to share Geo-
referencing information about 
subscribers in limited cases?





Figure 11.  Cellular/Wireless Assessment Form (2 of 4) 
1 Time of assessment post disaster
2 Region
3 Regional  Contact
4 Regional up to date coverage maps available
Network Status
5 %age Sites out of action
6 %age coverage in Region pre disaster
7 %age coverage in Region post disaster  - Minimum
8 %age coverage in Region post disaster  - Current
9 %age coverage in Region pre disaster
10 %age coverage in Region post disaster  - Minimum
11 %age coverage in Region post disaster  - Current
12 %age coverage in Region pre disaster
13 %age coverage in Region post disaster  - Minimum





18 %age sites still under mains power
19 % defecit of emergency power (sites without emergency power - Gap) 
20 Fuel Supply - OK
21 Fuel Logistics issues
22 Power  - Notes
23 Emergency Charging Points
24 Credit Recharge Services 
25 Additional  RQD -Emergency Charging Points
26 Additional  RQD Credit Recharge Services 
27
 Geographical areas without comms Area 1 Gap Area 1 Gap Area 1 Gap Area 1 Gap
Area 2 Gap Area 2 Gap Area 2 Gap Area 2 Gap
Area 3 Gap Area 3 Gap Area 3 Gap Area 3 Gap
Area 4 Gap Area 4 Gap Area 4 Gap Area 4 Gap
28
Hospitals Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement
Schools Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement
Evacuation centres Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement
Government distribution Point Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement
NGO/ 1st Responder locations Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement Name Location Requirement
Power
Urgent Points of Interest - without Comms
Operator 1 Operator 2 Operator 2 Operator 4
4G
Public Services - offerred
Known Gaps in service
Network Restrictions/Congestion























expected: updated geographic, demographic 
information
Emergency contact:
Ministry of "Communications" or equivalent
Ministry of "Interior"/"Planning" or equivalent
General Info
Organization Name
Emergency Contacts (mobile phone, email, 
Skype)
Capabilities
Localization / Translation / Local tech 
support / Local tech development / Mobile 
data collection / GIS expertise
Existing international customers
Tech Community
Have there been local bar camps, criss 
hackathons, or similar informal events?
Is there a GIS community, OSM group, or 
other local mapping-related organizations?
Are there prominent bloggers/social media 
participants that may becomes a good voice 







The previous chapter described a variety of available equipment that the 
Netted Humanitarians of RTAT could utilize in order to accomplish their mission. This 
working group would be responsible for making final decisions on the specific equipment 
and technology that would compose the Netted Humanitarian FLAK. Since there is an 
obvious cost associated with purchasing and usage costs of the equipment in the FLAK, 
close coordination with the funding working group is of utmost importance. Furthermore, 
the equipment working group must coordinate with the training working group in order to 
ensure the team members are training on the technology and equipment the working 
group decides upon. Special consideration needs to be taken into account to allow for 
ease of interoperability with the technology and equipment commonly used by other 
member of the IHC. 
h. Operations 
Aside from having a Team Leader who will act as primarily a coordinator 
and the Lead SME, the operations of the RTAT will be much more decentralized rather 
than hierarchical in nature. This structure will align much more closely with the way 
NGOs and the majority of the IHC organizations are structured when responding to a 
disaster. Despite this fact, there has to be some standards and logic for the manner in 
which the team will operate once on the ground. In order to ensure the team is fully 
prepared to conduct ICT assessment operations, this working group will have to 
coordinate with each of the other working groups to strive for effective operations. The 
end result of the efforts of this working group will be documents that outline the Concept 
of Operations (CONOPS), Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) and Tactics, Training, 
and Procedures (TTP) for the RTAT.   
i. Logistics 
Although the Netted Humanitarians of RTAT are expected to be self-
sufficient to the maximum extent possible, the team supplies are likely to be exhausted 
within 7–10 days. Having a logistics system in place to resupply the team depending on 
the length of the deployment is crucial. Depending on the scope of the disaster and the 
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impact on the local area, these supplies may have to travel long distances to get to the 
team. This working group would be dedicated to building a supply chain infrastructure 
and developing working solutions to ensure that the team arrives on scene prepared to 
conduct its mission, and that it will remain resupplied for the entire length of the 
deployment. The U.S. military members of RTAT will likely play a critical role in this 
working group, due to the enormous heavy lift and resupply capabilities of the U.S. 
military. 
B. PROCESS IMPROVEMENT AREAS 
1. Standardized Training Improves Effectiveness and Efficiency 
One way to strengthen relationships and pass on organizational memory is 
disaster management training. Training plays a vital role in disaster preparedness. Often 
the training sessions, whether they are disaster simulations, seminars, or informal 
meetings, not only provide knowledge and skills, but also facilitate and strengthen 
relationships among responders (Gibbons, 2007). For these reasons, it is imperative that 
the Netted Humanitarians of RTAT are trained to the same standards. By training and 
conducting exercises together the team will build familiarity and trust that are crucial to 
success during real-world disasters. 
The current processes for training first responders are disjointed and do not 
prepare them for the realities they will encounter during a disaster relief mission. Once 
the first responders arrive in the disaster area and are exposed to the chaos and confusion 
of relief efforts, they often are overwhelmed and fall into defensive positions and do not 
coordinate well (Denning, 2006). The presence of multiple agencies with multiple 
jurisdictions is daunting and is exacerbated by incompatible communications equipment 
and differing incident management processes. Moreover, the training is fragmented 
because it is normally conducted internally by individual organizations. Each 
organization has its own training requirements and standards for their first responders and 
volunteers, which usually are not focused on preparing its members to effectively and 
efficiently collaborate and coordinate with responders from other responding 
organizations. Furthermore, programs like NIMS and ICS that were created to train 
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personnel who are directly involved in emergency management and response are focused 
on federal, state, and local government responders, not on NGOs and international aid 
organizations. The reasoning for NIMS training, which was intended to aid people who 
do not usually work together or even know how each other operates to seamlessly 
respond to and recover from a disaster, is sound in principle and could be used as a model 
for creating the training curriculum for RTAT members. However, there needs to be a 
strong focus within the RTAT community on putting some weight behind NIMS-like 
training. It needs to be more than just lip service. 
 One of the most commonly identified areas for improvement in disaster relief 
missions is improving the way the IHC trains and exercises. Perhaps the key mechanism 
for testing, practicing, refining, and inculcating new lessons-derived behaviors is 
exercising (Donahue & Tuohey, 2006). RTAT exercises need to find a balance between 
being challenging, while at the same time realistic. It is far easier to train and design 
exercises for known emergencies than it is to create, refine and implement unknown 
emergency scenarios. Either way, the exercises must cement the concepts taught in 
training classes and seminars while at the same time pushing the boundaries of what the 
trainees are capable of handling. In order to prepare them for the how events will unfold 
in a real disaster, responders must feel what it is like to be overwhelmed and learn to 
adapt and overcome the difficulties they are sure to encounter.   
Those responsible for designing and evaluating RTAT training scenarios must 
also change some of the ways in which they conduct and evaluate scenarios. Exercises 
should be recast as learning activities targeted at improving performance, not punitive 
tests where failure is treated with disdain (Donahue & Tuohey, 2006). Mistakes are 
bound to happen; the focus should be on learning from them. Finally, training exercises 
need to be more narrowly focused on accomplishing a limited set of training objectives, 
rather than attempting to accomplish a wide-ranging set of objectives. This stipulation 
will serve to ensure that the goals of the exercise are explicit and cut down on confusion 




with more specific goals, will also help ensure that the trainees are gaining more value 
from the objectives of the exercise, rather than receiving superficial exposure to training 
regarding a large number of objectives.  
Receiving classroom training that will be reinforced through training exercises 
and scenarios will serve to ensure that the Netted Humanitarians of RTAT learn to 
operate together as a tight knit unit. They must be trained to operate their gear when time 
is of the essence. They must be skilled at deploying quickly to a disaster zone and 
beginning the ICT assessment in an expeditious manner. Therefore, the training needs to 
be focused on instilling these skills in the team members until it is second nature and they 
operate like a finely tuned machine. Since the Netted Humanitarians are already SMEs in 
their areas of expertise, much of the focus will be on teaching tactics, concept of 
operations and working together as a team. Receiving this type of training will create a 
camaraderie and esprit de corps that will greatly benefit the team when it is deployed to 
disaster zone where confusion reigns. Moreover, the team will learn to be not only 
effective in accomplishing their mission, but to be efficient in conducting the ICT 
assessment as well.   The grave nature of disasters and the limited time and personnel 
resources that are likely to be available make efficiency of operations a critical skill set to 
possesses and maintain. 
2. Data Fusion Improves Collaboration and Coordination 
As discussed in Chapter III, it is nearly impossible for multiple responding 
organizations to effectively and efficiently collaborate in assessing the various needs of 
the affected area without sharing information with one another. Data fusion software that 
is capable of combining disparate sources of information into one situational awareness 
tool that is accessible by all stakeholders is a crucial asset. The current process for fusing 
data is disjointed, thus collaboration and coordination between responding organizations 
is painful and inefficient. Despite sharing the common goal of assisting the affected 
population, and even if responding organizations have developed the trust required to 
share information, creating an all-inclusive COP is very difficult. Each organization will 
likely have its own pre-existing methods to model and share their situational awareness. 
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Fusing this information into one COP is affected by everything from differences in 
human languages, database schema, collection methodology, and problem domain 
(Palantir, 2012).   
In order to achieve the important tasks of HA/DR, such as  ICT assessment, 
coordination of effort, triage, and getting good data into the hands of decision makers and 
aid workers, responders need to integrate that knowledge into a common operating 
picture that accurately models the evolving situation on the ground. This is especially true 
in the collection of ICT assessment data. Not having the tools to communicate, or not 
having a knowledge of what parts of the ICT infrastructure were affected by the disaster, 
directly impacts all facets of relief efforts. Therefore, data fusion software is important to 
RTAT’s mission of gathering and collecting the results of their ICT assessment. 
Palantir has already utilized its data fusion software product in two highly visible 
disaster relief missions. The first of these was in response to the Haiti earthquake of 
2010. The ad-hoc collection of military and civilian organizations that came together to 
provide relief resulted in the usual difficulties in collaborating and sharing information. 
Each organization maintained a detailed picture of their area of responsibility, but a 
shared COP did not exist. To address this problem Palantir Philanthropy Engineers set up 
a publicly available instance of their Palantir government data fusion software. This 
allowed for the creation of a COP that compiled relevant open-source data of the situation 
on the ground in Haiti to assist relief workers in their mission.  
The instance of the COP created by Palantir included the locations and names of 
collapsed buildings, Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps, and SMS message 
hotspots (See Figure 14). Adding in map layers allowed decision makers to be able to 
find out what administrative zones any point on the map were located in. Additionally, 
the mapped data allowed user to access the information via a suite of visualization, 
analysis, querying and collaboration tools that gave them the ability to receive useful 
information to practical questions. For example: 
 Which administrative sectors have had the most SMS requests for food in 
the past 24 hours?  
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 What collapsed buildings are there that may contained hazardous materials 
that will require special cleanup? 
 Are any IDP camps near enough to these hazmat sites to warrant special 
precautions or moving the residents? 
 What is the status of wireless/cellular communications in a particular 
sector?   
 What is the status of restoring ground based copper wire communications 
in a particular sector? 
 
 
Figure 14.  Visualizing SMS hotspots following the Haiti earthquake in Palantir  
(From Palantir, 2012) 
A more recent example that depicts how powerful data fusion software can be 
during an HA/DR mission took place during relief efforts in New York City after 
Hurricane Sandy struck the region in late October 2012. This time around, Palantir’s 
Philanthropy Engineering team deployed to the Rockaway neighborhood of Queens to 
assist a non-profit relief organization composed of military veterans, known as Team 
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Rubicon. Operating from a parking lot on Rockaway Beach Boulevard, Team Rubicon 
volunteers utilized Palantir software to create a Hurricane Sandy relief instance. 
Palantir’s data fusion software allowed relief coordinators from Team Rubicon to 
utilize the instance to create a COP that gave them the ability to accurately track the 
position of their volunteers in the field using GPS. Additionally, volunteers had the 
capability to upload geo-tagged photos from their smartphones and laptops for later 
reference and to build a complete situational awareness tool. By combining several layers 
of information, such as demographic and census data, poverty rates, and even the status 
of neighborhood pharmacies, the relief workers were better able to prioritize the locations 
in greatest need of aid (Palantir, 2012). Word spread quickly throughout the course of 
Hurricane Sandy relief efforts about the success Team Rubicon was having in 
coordinating and collaborating with other relief agencies to provide relief. Soon, both 
government agencies and NGOs began sending their volunteers to Team Rubicon 
headquarters for situational awareness and further tasking (Palantir, 2012). 
This type of software holds promise when applied to the mission of the Netted 
Humanitarians of RTAT. Netted Humanitarians can begin the critical process of 
populating and updating a real-time COP that is easily accessible and simple to update. 
As they begin the difficult yet critical task of assessing the status of the ICT 
infrastructure, they can begin to create a situational awareness tool that follow-on first 
responders can utilize to prioritize needs and streamline relief efforts. Creating a network 
environment that allows information from disparate sources to be consolidated in a single 
situational awareness tool is a very powerful asset. This shared environment solves many 
of the issues faced by first responders in disaster relief missions. Time and again lessons 
learned have outlined how difficult it is for relief agencies to collaborate and share 
information when the multiple networks fail to be interoperable. Data fusion software 
that allows responders to have an accurate picture of the situation is indeed a powerful 
tool that will allow them to focus on conducting the crucial task of relief and recovery 
efforts, rather than spending an inordinate amount of time and resources guessing what 
the priorities might be. Giving decision makers the information they require to make 
timely and informed decisions would greatly improve the current disaster relief process. 
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3. RTAT Creates Liaisons for Responding Organizations 
When natural disasters strike, a multitude of first responders from the IHC 
deploy to the disaster zone with the goal of providing relief to the affected population. 
These relief efforts range from providing medical supplies and services to establishing 
reliable communications. The varying missions, organizational cultures and operating 
procedures makes it very difficult to share information, which is the true life blood of 
relief efforts. The different backgrounds and areas of expertise of the first responder 
communities is both a source of strength and an obstacle to cooperation and 
collaboration. 
It is a source of strength in the sense that every one of the relief 
organizations brings personnel with unique skill sets, they provide important services in 
their area of expertise, they utilize innovative tools to speed recovery and most 
importantly they bring indispensable knowledge and experience. The relief workers that 
form the backbone of the IHC are highly motivated and committed people that take their 
jobs very seriously. They are adept at embracing the chaos that is inherent post-disaster 
and in utilizing their expertise in the best way they know how in order to bring relief to 
those in need. Additionally, they accomplish this with very little in the way of a 
hierarchical chain of command. However, the individual cultures and preferred manner 
for conducting relief efforts is an impediment to making the relief process more efficient. 
Attaining trust and achieving true collaboration between agencies is a constant struggle. 
The current assessment process is characterized by multiple assessments 
conducted by multiple organizations, utilizing stove piped systems that do not talk to one 
another and are not interoperable. However, the biggest obstacle to effectively assessing 
the magnitude of the disaster is not the failure to integrate technology but rather the 
failure to integrate the knowledge held by first responders. The reasons for this are many, 
but generally revolve around the issue of trust and the lack of communication mediums 
available to make knowledge management and data integration a reality. On the 
occasions when this sharing of knowledge between organizations actually takes place, the 
common theme is that firmly established relationships between the organizations were 
already in place after having worked together in the field on previous disaster missions. 
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Adding to the collaboration issues, some organizations just prefer to work on their own 
and are more averse than others to coordinating efforts. This is especially true in the often 
conflicting cultures and operating norms of military first responders and some NGOs. 
This is often exacerbated by the requirement some NGOs have to remain neutral in 
certain countries and during conflicts. Operating side by side with military responders 
puts them in a precarious situation with regard to neutrality.   
The difficulty in making a collaborative response a reality is the single 
biggest impediment to a more efficient and effective response effort. Along with the lack 
of familiarity in operating together with other first responders comes the lack of 
understanding of the way other responders are organized. This in turn breeds confusion 
and leads to a lack of willingness to better integrate efforts. Breaking down these glaring 
weaknesses is one of the biggest reasons for having RTAT be made up of Netted 
Humanitarians that are from responder organizations of all types and backgrounds. As 
was mentioned earlier, training together and conducting exercises together will certainly 
contribute to RTAT members operating more effectively in the field. The RTAT team is 
essentially a mechanism for breaking down the walls of mistrust and building a rapport, 
understanding and appreciation for the capabilities that each organization brings to relief 
efforts. It allows for the melding of individual skills and the building of interpersonal 
relationships between the individual Netted Humanitarians that become a collective 
strength allowing the team to function effectively and accomplish the mission of 
assessing the ICT situation.     
Inevitably, the individual Netted Humanitarians will develop an 
understanding of the differences and similarities between their parent organization and 
that of the other members of the team. Over time, they will develop a richer 
understanding of the nuances and unique characteristics of the other responder 
organizations. This knowledge and understanding is quite powerful. This is something 
that can be shared with their parent organization to promote better understanding and 
trust between the various organizations. Since the RTAT is designed to be deployed to 
the disaster site within 12–24 hours, they will likely be the first international responders 
on the scene. The knowledge they will acquire early in the disaster response will be much 
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sought after by follow-on forces as they too arrive.   RTAT members will be capable of 
acting as liaisons between the organizations of the IHC, and should play a critical role in 
breaking down many of the barriers to developing trust and familiarity between the 
responders. This should promote a greater willingness to share information and work 
toward a more collaborative response effort.  
The preceding examples encapsulate a part of the resulting process improvement 
that can result from implementation of RTAT and the Netted Humanitarian. However, 
there are numerous other possible examples, many of which have likely yet to be thought 
of or discovered. The bottom line is that we know the current process is broken and 
ineffective. To do nothing is not a viable or sustainable option. The IHC is keenly aware 
of the current deficiencies in the ICT assessment process and must be willing to move 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. THESIS SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objective of this thesis was to research and propose a possible 
solution for overcoming a glaring deficiency in disaster response: conducting effective 
post-disaster ICT assessments. The concepts of the Netted Humanitarian and the Rapid 
Technology Assessment Team were meant to address and overcome this deficiency, as 
well as the many other issues inherent in HA/DR missions. Continuing the trend of 
ignoring the findings of numerous lessons learned was no longer an option. Therefore, 
this thesis advocates for change in order to improve the current process and to provide aid 
to the affected population more quickly and efficiently.  
During the course of this research the concept of the Netted Humanitarian 
morphed from being a stand-alone portable fly away kit (FLAK) that could be carried by 
individual first responders, into the employment of the Netted Humanitarian within the 
construct of a team. The concept of a team of netted first responders eventually became 
linked to the RTAT program, which was funded and sponsored by Office of Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) from 2010–2012. The vision of the RTAT has taken root among the first 
responder community, and much progress is being made by many of the stakeholders 
described in this thesis to come together, collaborate, and move toward implementing 
many of the concepts described in this research.       
The equipment described in this research provides a handful of examples of the 
current technology available to assist the Netted Humanitarian in carrying out their 
mission. Without a doubt technologies will continue to evolve and systems will become 
more and more capable. However, it is equally important that end users and procurement 
officials ensure that the technology is mature and proven prior to utilizing scarce 
resources. Furthermore, it is critical to ensure the equipment is interoperable and that 
open architectures are utilized whenever possible to provide greater flexibility and 
opportunities for collaboration and information sharing.  
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B. FUTURE REASEARCH 
This thesis focuses primarily on describing the concepts of the Netted 
Humanitarian and RTAT and discussing the impact they will have on improving the ICT 
assessment process. Further research is required in order to continue refinement of the 
concepts and to fully develop mechanisms to take the vision from conceptual to reality. 
For example, further research is needed for RTAT to refine the ICT assessment forms 
from their current Excel format into a more robust application and hardware platform that 
will permit inputting of ICT information in a field environment. Finally, this research 
viewed the implementation process for RTAT and Netted Humanitarians through a very 
broad lens, future research could focus more narrowly on the economic and 
organizational challenges likely to be encountered by the IHC in implementing these 
concepts. 
1. Field Testing Netted Humanitarian FLAK   
With regard to developing a FLAK for use by Netted Humanitarians, this thesis 
focuses on identifying and describing a variety of communications equipment and 
information technologies that could be included in this kit. Future research should focus 
on identifying a basic, semi-concrete list of equipment and technologies that will 
comprise the Netted Humanitarian FLAK. It should be semi-concrete because the kit will 
certainly require some modification depending on the nature and scope of the disaster. 
Furthermore, with the rapid pace at which technology is constantly being developed and 
improved, it is highly desirable to ensure the FLAK is easy to upgrade and composed of 
interchangeable components. In addition to identifying the equipment that will comprise 
the kit, future research also needs to consider field testing the technologies in realistic 
training exercises and disaster response scenarios. Field testing will verify if the 
equipment and technology in the FLAK is the optimal mix that will allow Netted 
Humanitarians to successfully carry out their mission. Finally, field testing will also 
verify the suitability and survivability of the individual components of the kit in a variety 
of scenarios, as well as geographic and weather conditions. 
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2. Developing and Maintaining Military Netted Humanitarians 
No amount of goodwill on the part of the military first responders will overcome 
lack of familiarity and training in operating HFN equipment in an HA/DR environment. 
Military first responders must be trained to understand crucial elements of disaster 
response, such as how to quickly gain situational awareness, understanding what the 
information sharing needs are, and who needs what information and when (Janssen, 
2010). Furthermore, military responders need to learn how to more tactfully coordinate 
their relief efforts with those of the rest of the early responder community. This 
knowledge could also be harnessed in realistic coordinated exercises with other agencies, 
IGOs and NGOs. This thesis that training specialized HFN operators to work in the 
chaotic and often frustrating realm of HA/DR is no small feat.  
Future research could focus on developing possible methods for identifying and 
qualifying military members to be Netted Humanitarians in an RTAT. A possible 
approach for selecting prospective Netted Humanitarian would be to look for military 
members with a background in portable communications and who have past experience 
operating in an HA/DR environment. These prospective candidates would receive RTAT 
training as outlined in this thesis. Enlisted sailors would earn a Navy Enlisted 
Classification (NEC) after completion of the training. Officer Netted Humanitarians 
would receive a sub-specialty code that would be annotated in the Officer’s Service 
Record.  
Another possible option would be to create RTAT trained rapidly deployable 
HFN mobile units. These specially trained and supported units would be on standby to 
support authorities wherever the need arises, whether in response to floods, tornados, 
earthquakes, or tropical storms. These types of units are likely to be better served in the 
National Guard units of individual states. Future research should also look for solutions 
in implementing and maintaining a pool of “on-call” qualified military personnel that are 
RTAT trained and qualified. This would allow for the military to maintain a searchable 
database that would simplify the process of providing Netted Humanitarians to RTAT. 
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3. HA/DR Applications for Data Fusion Software 
The realm of data fusion software, specifically in the area of HA/DR, holds a 
great amount of promise for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of future disaster 
response missions. Future research could involve conducting an in depth research and 
analysis on the capabilities and process improvement that could result from data fusion 
software in assessment and recovery efforts. Additionally, there are many other options 
that involve more specific mission software. These include easily searchable database 
repositories for Lessons Learned. Finally, given the open API of data fusion software 
makers such as Palantir, many possibilities exist for developing third-party applications 
that can “plug and play” and improve the user experience in the original software. Future 
research can certainly be conducted on the types of third-party applications that should be 
considered for development. 
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